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In support of US regional strategy requirements this
thesis focuses on Sweden. The change in Sweden's neutrality
policy, coupled with an increased defence budget, are the
two most apparent developments. Less visible are changes in
Swedish defence doctrine, missions and capability. This
thesis will attempt to predict the degree and character of
Sweden's move toward integration into broader security
arrangements and identify the relevant implications.
Further, this thesis contends that the two developments of
that are shaping Swedish security policy in new directions
are the end of the Cold War and Sweden's integration into
the European Coimmnity (EC). In the short term, this
implies for Sweden a security policy more closely paralleled
with US objectives. In the long term what has been largely
a bilateral Swedish-US strategic relationship will be
engulfed in larger US-European questions. Within an
integrated Europe, Sweden will be in a grouping of European
states the most favorable to US policy.
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The two overriding and inter-related developments that
are shaping changes in Swedish security policy are the end
of the Cold War and Sweden's integration into the European
Community (EC). However, large segments of the Swedish
population continue to associate the traditional
"neutrality" policy with their cultural identity. All the
major parties feel the need to at least pay "lip service" to
this traditional policy until Sweden is safely integrated
into the EC.
The move away from neutrality while still prohibiting
formal military alliances, allows for a looser
interpretation of ad hoc military cooperation in the sense
that foreign policy no longer has to heed the declaratory
non-alignment criteria. What can dramatically change this
trend towards greater cooperation with the West is the rise
of a resurgent reactionary regime in Moscow.
When reading Swedish literature it is important to note
that the term "security policy" is often used --- not to
refer to traditional defense policy --- but to such things
as refugees, crime and environmental degradation. The drive
for formal change in Sweden's declaratory security policy is
the need to facilitate Sweden's acceptance and subsequent
integration in the EC. This will not change if the Social
Democrats regain power.
Long term concern with Russian military capabilities
vii
will remain a permanent fixture of Swedish security policy.
in all scenarios the strategic and environmental nuclear
threats on the Kola Peninsula will remain. It will remain
is in Sweden's national interest for a viable US strategic
presence in the North Atlantic. Fostering economic and
political stability in the former Soviet Union, particularly
in the Baltic states, is a "security" objective. The Baltic
security threat is perceived in terms of the already
developing massive influx of refugees, viewed as a crisis,
particularly in lieu of a Sweden's very high unemployment
rate.
Sweden has much to offer for any US forces operating in
the Baltic littoral region. However, a direct Swedish
military contribution in a Baltic contingency, such as a
Russian attack on one of the newly independent Baltic
states, would not be compatible with current security
policy.
The current impetus for increase in the defense budget
has been the long delayed need to modernize, particularly
the Army --- not strategic change. Paradoxically, as
American and Swedish relations have improved, the likelihood
of Sweden's reliance on American systems, in the long term,
appears to have diminished and closer cooperation with
European industry more likely.
Sweden is not being driven into 'Europe' by the changed
strategic environment and the regional stability following
viii
the Soviet collapse. Rather, it is more accurate to
characterize Sweden's policy shift as one primarily
motivated by economic necessity, enabled by the Soviet
collapse. Sweden is no longer "neutralu but will retain
many of the distinctive characteristics associated with its
traditional policy and Nordic identity. Membership in NATO
is not a near term reality. Membership in the Western
European Union (WEU) offers few benefits. Swedish
participation in joint operations in conjunction with
regional exercises and UN or Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) missions, will be more
frequent. Limited Nordic defense cooperation is progressing
but will not proceed to a degree which could interfere with
Sweden's EC membership.
In the long term Sweden's membership in the EC will
facilitate greater integration with the European defense
industry and security structures. This European integration
portends greater cooperation within Europe than bilateral
links across the Atlantic. Such a development will impact
overall Swedish-US relations, which will become, part of the
larger US-European question. In this "European" context
Sweden is likely to be amongst the group within the EC most
favorable to continued US engagement on the continent. This
pro-US attitude will best serve Sweden's long term interests
and will likely remain constant with changes in government.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The end of the Cold War has changed US strategy, and
more specifically, how strategic planners and intelligence
professionals "function" in support of that new strategy.
The constant theme following the collapse of our superpower
rival has been the adjusting of our national strategy to a
multi-polar environment. This is explicitly stated in The
National Security Strategy of the United States. The most
significant impact of this evolving national strategy on the
US Navy is the new emphasis on regional contingency
operations in littoral regions. As summarized by Colin
Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff (CJCS),
"Because of the changes in the strategic environment, the
threats we expect to face are regional rather than global."
[Ref. 1:p. 11] The US Navy and Marine Corps have set forth
the principal elements and priorities with which to guide
strategic and operational planning to support this new
regional focus in the Naval Service Doctrinal White Paper,
"...From the Sea," September 1992. Implementation of this
concept requires, "...the ability to orchestrate the
appropriate response and to send precisely tailored,
diplomatic, economic, and military signals to influence the
actions of adversaries." [Ref. 2:p. 5] In his "Posture
Statement," 3 May 1993, Rear Admiral Edward D. Sheafer, Jr.,
1
Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI), stresses that "...it
is likely that there will be increasing manifestations of
short-term, less clearly-defined coalitions, built around
often transient threats to common interests rather than
formal alliance structures." [Ref. 3:p. 9] Such was the
case in the recent Gulf War. But as Colonel Dennis M. Drew
and Dr. Donald M. Snow emphasize in their book Making
Strategy, "...the United States and its allies may have
different political objectives or hidden political agendas
that result in divergent military objectives." [Ref. 4:p.
95]
In attempting to contribute to currently evolving
requirements in regional contingency planning, this thesis
will focus on Sweden. Many of the assumptions which guided
Sweden's security policy have also collapsed with the Cold
War. As the capabilities of the former Soviet Baltic fleet
continues to decline Sweden's relative significance as an
actor in the Baltic will likely increase, as will Germany's.
Sweden is both a particular challenge and relevant for
regional planning. Their is an obvious potential for a
political, economic and/or environmental crisis in the
Baltic states of the former Soviet Union in which Sweden
will likely be a significant actor. Additionally, the
current relevance of Sweden to US planning is demonstrated
by US-Swedish operations in the field in Macedonia (under
United Nations (UN) auspices) as well as the recent (June
2
1993) first time participation by Sweden in a US Baltic Sea
naval exercise (BALTOPS 93) [Ref. 5]. Rather than a
"country study," it is hoped the key aspects of Swedish
strategic/security thinking, capability and policy, which
have direct ramifications for US regional planning
scenarios, can be identified.
Throughout the Cold War, though the strongest Nordic
state, Sweden remained outside of any formal miliary
alliance and maintained a declaratory policy of "neutrality"
in a war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In the post-Cold
War environment a great deal of these "traditional" tenents
of Swedish foreign and security policy has changed. Both
the global and regional strategic balance has been altered
by the Soviet collapse, but not to the same degree,
particularly from the perspective of the Nordic states [Ref.
6:p. 4]. Some of these changes are intuitive, a great many
are not.
A further complication for US planners focused on the
Baltic region, Northern Europe, or potential coalition
operations which include Sweden, has been established by Dr.
Paul M. Cole, currently at the Rand Corporation, in his
exhaustive detailed and controversial (in Sweden) 1990
doctoral dissertation for The Johns Hopkins University,
Neutralite' du jour: The conduct of Swedish security policy
since 1945: ". .. Sweden's security policy has consisted of
three separate parts: A declaratory policy, an operational
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policy that consistently contradicts the declared policy,
and a misconception of the role of the United States in the
defense of Sweden." [Ref. 7:p. 1]
But what is currently most striking is that Sweden's
declaratozy neutrality policy has changed. Both the Prime
Minister Carl Bildt and the Defense Minister Anders Bjorck,
have stated that the old policy of neutrality is gone; that
Sweden is aware of the security implications of its request
to join the European Economic Community (EC); and further,
will not shy away from those ramifications. Stated the
Defense Minister in an address in Tokyo on 23 November 1992:
As a member of the European Union, Sweden will
participate fully in the common security and foreign
policy which was laid down in the Maastricht Treaty...
A "policy of neutrality" is no longer a suitable
designation for the policy Sweden wants to pursue. It
would be unwise if Sweden excluded itself from future
security policy options. Today, Sweden's security
policy may be said to stand on two pillars; a foreign
policy with a European identity and independent forces.
[Ref. 8:p. 9]
This change in Sweden's neutrality policy, coupled with
an increased defense budget (at a time when no other
Northern European nation has a similar increase) are the
most apparent developments of interest for US strategic
planners. Significantly however, much of the current
academic and professional discussion in Sweden regarding
such relevant issues as future military alliances,
participation in limited purpose coalitions, threat
perceptions, arms control, confidence and security building
measures (CSBMs), as well as the very meaning of the terms
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secuzity, non-alignment and neutrality, are heavily nuanced
in rhetoric targeted for very different domestic and
international audiences. Developments less visible but also
of specific interest to military planners as well as
operators are changes in Swedish defense doctrine, missions
and capability, cooperative military exchanges, potential
for inter-operability and intelligence sharing in a regional
scenario. This thesis will attempt to "crack the code" and
predict the degree and qualitative character of Sweden's
move *oward integration into broader security arrangements
and identify the relevant implications to US interests.
Further, this thesis contends that the two recent overriding
and inter-related developments of great long term strategic
significance that are shaping Swedish security policy in new
directions are the end of the Cold War and Sweden's
integration into the European Community (RC). This thesis
will argue, that in the short term, these two developments
imply for Sweden a security policy more closely paralleled
with US regional and international security objectives which
will allow for greater bilateral military cooperation. In
the long term, primarily economic factors, will draw what
has been largely a bilateral Swedish-US strategic
relationship, into the larger US-Europe question; but within
an integrated Europe --- for strategic reasons that are
unlikely to change --- this thesis argues that Sweden will
be in a grouping of European states the most favorable to US
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policy. Section II provides a background on Sweden's
strategic culture; section III summarizes the changes in
Swedish strategic perceptions; section IV examines the
likely longevity of non-alignment and the role international
and regional organizations are likely to play in Swedish
security policy; section V focuses on the correlation
between the Swedish defense budget and security objectives;
section VI the impact of European integration on the Swedish
arms industry; section VII the modernization of Swedish
forces; and section VIII, the potential for direct Swedish
military cooperation with the US.
1. BWEDEN' 8 STRATEGIC CULTURE
A. NEUTRALITY
What is geo-politically significant for Sweden is that
global strategic changes now allow her to pursue closer ties
with the continent, at a time when it is increasingly more
vital for her economic health, while also allowing for a low
visible impact on her traditional neutrality policy. This
policy of neutrality was developed by the long ruling Social
Democratic party, and has grown to be an essentially moral
issue within the party [Ref. 9]. While the Moderates, now
in power, have pursued a "European policy" for forty years,
they do not have the domestic political base to disregard
the Social Democrats, particularly on security issues.
Historically, the Social Democrats have gained domestic
popularity at Moderate and Conservative party expense on
contested security matters [Ref. 10]. Writes Paul Cole,
"...the Swedish Social Democratic Party [SAP] has used the
nation's security policy since 1945 to assert its dominance
i. domestic politics." [Ref. 7:p. 513] This is particularly
relevant in light of the fact that the Social Democrats are
confident, and according to national polls taken in May
1993, in a strong position to regain power in the elections
expected early in 1994 [Ref. 11].
Paul Cole holds the view that the current Commission on
the Policy of Neutrality is an attempt to destroy neutrality
as a barrier to European Community (EC) integration without
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destroying the reputation of assassinated Prime Minister
Olof Palme (Ref. 10]. Another aspect of the Social
Democratic position on the Commission is perhaps that they
are seeking to establish that they did indeed adhere to
Sweden's declaratory neutrality policy when they were in
power (Ref. 12]. The Commission was initiated by the
Riksdag in September 1992 to investigate covert security
ties with the West before 1969. The cut off year of 1969
was supposedly chosen as the defined end of the "Cold War,"
but is also the year Palme and the Social Democrats regained
power (Ref. 101. This is disputed by Pierre Schori, a
former Under Secretary of State for the Palme Government,
Member of Parliament, and current international affairs
spokesman for the Social Democratic Party. In an interview
on June of 1993, Schori denied that this Commission was a
Social Democratic initiative [Ref. 13]. Bo Petersson, press
spokesman for the Commission, attributes the basic
motivation to public interest:
I believe that the basic reason for the establishment
of the commission I am involved in was quite simply public
interest. The Swedish policy of neutrality had in the
post-war perici developed into a sacrosanctum, or at
least into something which came very close to being an end
in itself rather than, as was originally intended, a means
to the end of promotin' national security and well being.
Once this policy was put into question, it was quite
natural that public opinion took an interest in the
ensuing debate. For me personally, it is hard to discern
any political actor or collective of actors that would
stand to benefit specifically from the establishment of
the commission. [Ref. 14]
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Two former ambassadors, Sverker Astrom and Leif Leifland
have also been tasked with a study to ascertain how Swedish
policy of neutrality would be affected by membership in the
EC [Ref. 14].
The significant point for US regional planners is that
neutrality has been a charged domestic political issue for
years, particularly since the early 1980s, and still
lingers. Revelations that members of the current Government
sanctioned cooperation with NATO or that the Social
Democrats deliberately "appeased" the Soviet Union have been
frequent in the press. Writes Paul Cole:
After the Social Democrats returned to power in 1982
the foreign policy scene in Sweden lurched from one
political scandal to the next. The Ferm, Bildt, Bahr, and
Bodstrom affairs divide the security policy debate along
party lines. The nonsocialist opposition attempted to
discredit the government (then Social Democratic) by
raising the possibility of a systematic, pro-Soviet bias
within the Social Democratic Party leadership. The Social
Democrats fought back by alleging that the opposition
would not stop until Sweden's "traditional" security
policy had been completely undermined....
Palme's goal was to make the opposition appear to be
against neutrality and somehow un-swedish. [Ref. 7:pp.
494-95]
Prime Minister Bildt was heavily involved in the
security debate in the 1980s:
Those who called for tougher diplomatic responses
against the Soviet Union and a greater emphasis on the
role of force in the resolution of the Soviet submarine
campaign were led by the Moderate Party, with defense
spokesman and Submarine Commission member Carl Bildt in
the forefront. [Ref. 7:p. 496]
What is not in dispute, is that a significant segment of
the Swedish population associate the traditional
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"neutrality" policy, whether real or a rhetorical illusion,
as part of their cultural identity. All the major parties
feel the need to at least pay "lip service" to this
traditional policy, particularly until Swoden is safely
integrated into the IC. Though the elites in the Moderate
lead Government as well as the Social Democratic opposition
agree on the need for EC membership, both fear a "no" vote
in the EC referendum scheduled for early 1994. A poll taken
in May of 1993 by Statistics Sweden indicated only a 28.2%
favorable vote, 42.5% negative and 28.1% undecided [Ref.
15]. In fact, polls indicate that the majority of members
within the Social Democratic Party are opposed to the EC
despite the pro-EC position of their leaders. The Left
(former Communist Party), Green, Centre, and New Democrats
in particular also have signficant grassroot opposition
[Ref. 13]. Much of this anti-EC sentiment can be attributed
to fear among Swedes, evident in past EC referendums of the
Danes and Norwegians as well, that their "nordic" identify
will become lost in a union with the much larger continent.
Underlining this fear is a desire to remain distant from all
the "European problems" of crime, refugees, etc.. What is
significant, and verified by Schori, is that it is not in
the interest of the major parties to raise the security
implications of EC membership into a political debate,
particularly before the EC referendum. Dr. Ingemar Dorfer,
a Harvard-trained and respected conservative writer on
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Swedish defense matters, currently serving in the Foreign
Ministry, and close to the Prime Minister, stated succinctly
in a June 1993 interview that, "Policy makers in and out of
government do not want to discuss security issues until
after the referendum." [Ref. 16].
The move away from neutrality articulated by the
government still retains the proviso of no participation in
military alliances during peacetime. Prime Minister Bildt
has left open military cooperation with the UN and the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).
The government has also had security cooperation talks with
the Finns. While closing ranks with the Government and
reaching a consensus on the 1992-95 Defense Bill, Social
Democratic Foreign Policy Spokesman, Pierre Schori, made the
caveat of no military cooperation within an alliance a
special point of emphasis [Ref. 17]. Importantly, there
have also been recent, subtle changes to the official
definition of neutrality. The 199.: description of
security policy as declared by the Riksdag, in the official
English version published by the Defense Staff Information
Department under the heading of "The Aims of Sweden's
Security Policy" states that:
The security policy is based on the balance between
foreign policy and defense policy. The main feature of
the security policy is the policy of neutrality aiming at
non-alignment in peacetime and neutrality in war.
(Ref. 18:p. 2]
12.
This was changed in the 1992-93 edition:
Military non-alignment is the basis of our security
policy resulting in an obligation to maintain adequate
military capability to remain neutral in case of war in
our part of the world. We cannot rely on anyone but
ourselves to defend Sweden!
The security policy is based on the balance between
foreign policy and defense policy. [Ref. 19:p. 2]
Though perhaps somewhat obscure, the 1992-93 description
is considered a step away from traditional neutrality in
that it does not imply the need for a neutral "foreign
policy." Additionally the newer text adds the word
"military" to non-alignment. This change is considered
significant by defense professionals. While still
prohibiting formal military alliances, the new definition
allows for a looser interpretation of ad hoc military
cooperation in the sense that foreign policy no longer has
to heed the declaratory non-alignment criteria, i.e.,
allowing for bilateral exchanges, exercise participation
etc. A similar change is discernable in Finnish security
policy. [Ref. 20] [Ref. 21]
However, what can dramatically change this trend toward.
greater cooperation with the Went in security matters is a
change in Sweden's strategic environment; namely, the rise
of a resurgent reactionary regime in Moscow. A return to a
regional strategic situation similar to the East-West
bipolar standoff of the Cold War could cause a major shakeup
in Swedish strategic thinking and security policy. The real
key to predicting how this development will affect Sweden's
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security policy, in particular the move away from the
traditional tenents of "neutrality," is when this occurred.
In an interview with Ingemar Dorfer at the Foreign Ministry,
he expressed the view that the seizure of power by a
reactionary government in Russia will probably accelerate
Sweden's integration into Europe and into European security
systems if it occurred several years hence after the process
of integration has been institutionalized. If such a
strategic threat arose from the East currently, especially
before the EC referendum, there would be very strong
domestic political pressure to withdraw back to a more
isolationist policy. [Ref. 16]
B. VARXZD NZANINGB OF 8CURITY
When reading Swedish literature discussing security
matters, it is important to note that terms such as
"security policy" can have a much broader meaning than the
general American usage. It is important to note that the
term *security policyn is often used --- not to refer to
traditional defense policy --- but to such things as
refugees, crime and environmental degradation [Ref. 22].
This can be seen in that efforts to build-up the Baltic
states, politically and economically, as a component of
Swedish security policy. A Swedish "forward presence" by
non-lethal means [Ref. 5]. Such a distinction becomes
significant when interpreting official statements,
particularly in regards to recent public recognition of the
13
security implications of EC membership. For example, in a
speech in Paris on 4 June 1992 by Defense Minister Anders
Bjorck at the Western European Union (WEU), he recognizes
and accepts in Sweden's application for EC membership a
common "security policy," while explicitly making this
acceptance distinct from a common "defense policy":
The EC is developing in the direction for a European
Union, with a common security and foreign policy, and
possibly a common defense policy at some point in the
future.
Our application for membership of the EC is an
expression of the fact that we share the Community's
long-term objectives, as formulated in the Treaty of Rome
and the Single Act, and that Sweden will work for the
realization of these objectives together with other
member states. As a member of the European Union, Sweden
will participate fully in a common security and foreign
policy, as established in the Maastricht Agreement in the
autumn of 1991. [Ref. 23:pp. 6-7]
The point in the future which the Defense Minster is
referring to, is 1996, when a decision on a common "defense
policy" is scheduled to be made by an EC Ministerial
decision. Sweden is due to enter the EC in 1995. It is in
the Defense Minister's interest, his government's, as well
as the Social Democrats in opposition, not to pursue the
distinction between defense and security until that time
[Ref. 24]. Such a debate could jeopardize the EC referendum
vote. Additionally, their is generally a consensus on
security and defense matters at the policy implementation
level in Sweden. This was confirmed by Schori, remarking
that "the real difference in only the nuance." [Ref. 13]
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But it is also worth noting, that if the Social
Democrats do return to power, the rhetoric of this
difference in nuance on "collective security" differs
sharply from the ruling governments, with the weight heavy
on the non-military, non-traditional aspects. Bo Petersson
charactorizes this distinction, "...the government tends to
focus more on European, and above all, EC afiars, whereas
the Social Democrats traditionally have retained a more
universal outlook." [Ref. 141 In his contribution to a
report from the Olof Palme International Center, Schori
outlines the roots of the continuing Social Democratic
security vision:
Against the policy of confrontation and the arms
race pursued by the threatmongers in the nuclear age, Olof
Palme and his colleagues... launched the concept of Common
Security. It was a fairly simple concept; saying that
continued armaments would only lead to greater insecurity,
and in the end to disaster. Therefore, in the nuclear
age, you have to sit down with your opponent, and discuss
disarmament in balanced and mutual forms. Security could
never be achieved in confrontation with your opponent,
only together with him.
The political and military right reacted violently to
this view.
In 1992, even our Swedish prime minister, Carl Bildt,
praises Common Security. It took him ten years to make
a complete turnaround from having viewed Common Security
as giving in to communism, to saying Common Security is a
vision for us all. [Ref. 25:pp. 10-li]
Schori, also addresses another internal security debate:
"In a situation where all the Nordic countries become
members of the EEC [EC], we should not form a rigid Nordic
bloc...." [Ref. 25:p. 13] Then, after identifying the new
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regional dangers of chaos in the Baltic, he goes on to make
an appeal for the status quo on security matters, in effect,
diffusing Sweden's explicit move away from neutrality,
"...to fundamentally change Sweden's security policy,
especially a policy which has been so successful in
contributing to peace in our region, would increase
insecurity in Europe." [Ref. 25:p. 15]
What Schori is doing in one essay is addressing all
three of the concurrent security themes currently debated in
Sweden. And all three are for different audiences.
Reassurances that Sweden will incorporate a common European
foreign and security policy is affirmed to ease
international doubts and facilitate Sweden's acceptance into
the EC. Though obviously much different in nuance, the
Defense Minister's address also confronts this issue and is
similar in substance if very different in rhetoric.
Domestic political fears of losing Sweden's Nordic identity
and a move a way from neutrality are addressed by
emphasizing the non-military aspects of security policy and
a reaffirming the status quo on military non-alignment.
Schori must address anti-EC sentiment even within his own
party (the women's branch of the Party on the Left, in
particular). The Defense Minister's explicit distinction
between a common defense and a common security policy, is
similar in substance to Schori, and is also meant to
alleviate a backlash from the electorate. [Ref. 24]
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Schori's last quote which opposes a Nordic Block within
the EC is somewhat more obscure and will be discussed in
more detail in a later section. Briefly, Sweden's senior
military officer, the Supreme Commander, Bengt Gustafsson,
remarked that the Nordic states could not rely on Europe for
their defense and should form a block within the EC to
secure the permanence of the "Atlantic" (i.e., US) defense
link. He was mildly rebuked by the Defense Minister and
lambasted by Social Democrats, such as Schori, to whom such
a link, especially explicitly stated, is an anathema. [Ref.
26]
C. "OPERATIVE" VS "DECLARATORYN POLICY
The Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) study, Multinational
Naval Cooperation Options with the North Atlantic Countries,
December 1992, by Gary L. Geipel, makes a sharp distinction
between the pro-US views of the current government and the
more traditional, essentially Social Democratic Party legacy
which held a much less positive view of US security
objectives. For example, he concludes, "The current Bildt
administration is unusually pro-American, and a change in
Sweden's governing coalition almost certainly would make
naval cooperation with the United States more unlikely [Ref.
27:p. 45]. This is probably a valid conclusion, but perhaps
overstated. But the danger or likelihood that a new Social
Democratic lead Government will significantly reverse course
on the move away from neutrality is low. The strategic
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environment itself has undergone great change, not just
governments. Though significantly less interested in making
major changes in "traditional" security policy than the
current government, if they regain power the Social
Democrats are unlikely to spend political capital on
security issues one way or the other [Ref. 13]. They voted
for the increase in defense expenditure (the 1992-97 Defense
Bill) with the Government (this consensus has since broken
down and the defense budget increase has been reduced) and
have championed financing an expanded role for Swedish
peacekeeping-enforcing forces. [Ref. 13] [Ref. 17]
The real drive for formal change in Sweden's declaratory
security policy is the need to facilitate Sweden's
acceptance and subsequent integration in the EC. This will
not change if the Social Democrats regain power, unless
perhaps, there is massive grassroot dissension within the
Party. In fact, Schori himself remarked that their is the
potential for a Social Democratic Government to have greater
ease than the current Government in guiding the electorate
into the EC as it has been less identified in the past with
a "European Policy," and explicitly acknowledged the "Nixon-
China" parallel [Ref. 13]. Though a big leap, and one not
openly discussed, such a domestic political parallel might
also be relevant for any future move into a formal military
alliance.
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The subtle change in neutrality to nonalignment in peace
with the hope of remaining neutral in war was first
articulated on February 1 1992 by the Prime Minister Bildt,
in Paris before the EC Ministers --- the day formal EC
negotiations began [Ref. 24]. The Social Democrats
themselves initiated the move to membership in the EC,
largely in response to the precipitous rise in interest
rates and fiscal crisis of 1987 [Ref. 12].
However, a more contentious line of reasoning argues
that little will likely change in Swedish security policy
with a Social Democratic government, except perhaps
budgeting priority for defense needs, for they have
supported an operative pro-Western policy all along.
Historical cooperation with the West has received much press
in the early 1990s, and has itself become a domestic
political issue. Paul Cole made extensive use of US and
British archives for his dissertation on this issue and was
attacked in the press, particularly from leading Social
Democrats, such as Ambassador Sverker Astrom, who long
carried the torch of Foreign Minister Unden's neutrality
legacy, and who were in power for the preponderance of the
years in question [Ref. 10]. The following excerpt is a
good sampling of Cole's major point:
During the 1950s Sweden developed an operational
security relationship with various NATO nations which
accounts for the fact that in Sweden during the postwar
years the rhetoric of isolationism is found side-by-side
with the diplomacy of cooperation. This gradually became
the rhetoric of nonalignment which has coincided with a
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policy of political-military cooperation with NATO
countries. Sweden made a clear effort in its public
diplomacy to oppose the United States on many important
issues while secretly working to coordinate its security
policy with NATO interests. Sweden has made many
agreements and compromises with the United States and
other NATO countries that consistently contradict the
public rhetoric of isolationalism and nonalignment.
[Ref. 7:p. 12)
Interestingly, the response of many military officers
and government officials to the revelations by Cole and
others is on the order of, "What is the big deal?.. .It is
natural for Sweden to look after Swedish interests." The
implication here for US regional and strategic planners is
that it may be necessary to penetrate Swedish rhetoric, to
an unusually demanding degree, to ascertain Swedish
intentions and objectives. A good guideline would be to
begin by identifying what directly supports Sweden's
national interest in any given scenario. Much of the
subterfuge is dictated by domestic politics, and not
necessarily of a sinister nature. However, the need to use
such traditional rhetoric as a foreign policy tool has
obviously diminished with the collapse of the bi-polar world
regime. The conjecture that Swedish security will be much
more straight forward in the future appears to be born out
by recent writings and is supported by the openness of the
interviews obtained for this thesis. However, the use of
the rhetoric of neutrality for a singularly domestic
political agenda has not dissipated. "Neutrality" will
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likely remain a significant political issue, particularly as
the EC referendum vote approaches.
D. LUGKLLSTIC APPROACHES TO SECURXTY ISSuES
1. Historical Roots
Sweden has a history of emphasizing legal issues to
achieve security objectives, particularly in maritime
matters, dating back to her days as the dominant Baltic
power under Charles XII, "For hundreds of years Sweden has
sought to foster its interests by influencing the maritime
legal framework." [Ref. 28:p. 168] Initially, during the
1700s, making the Baltic a mare clausum, a Swedish lake, was
the objective. This shifted with the relative decline in
Swedish power to a mare liberum policy, which continues to
this day. The significant point is that the traditional
Swedish emphasis on legal issues furthered her strategic
objectives. During the 1970s, however, other aspects, such
as disarmament, ". .. has become an issue, often with its own
momentum." [Ref. 2 8:p. 168) Nonetheless, there remains a
linkage between Swedish disarmament policies and "...more
directly interest-driven polices." [Ref. 28:p. 168]
Naval arms control and disarmament, by the early
1980s had progressed to become a highly politicized issue in
Sweden. Particularly within the Social Democratic party,
large segments viewed disarmament, especially nuclear
disarmament, as a detached goal. This vocal group "tends to
view disarmament as an end itself, as it were, divorced from
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the strategic considerations usually associated with the
concept of arms control." [Ref. 28:p. 169] The UN was the
main forum for pursuing these policies in the 1980s. But
what makes these Swedish disarmament policies, championed
internationally, hard to reconcile historically with Swedish
strategic objectives and security policy, is that they were
not universally accepted within the Swedish defense
establishment. Politically powerful disarmament proponents
"co-existed with more hard-nosed pragmatists." [Ref. 28:p.
169]
2. Naval Arms Control
In the recent past, heavy Swedish diplomatic effort
in the international arms control arena, appeared to a large
degree, to be independent of an equal concern for
verification of agreement compliance. Continuing to
exasperate the Swedes, Russian submarines continued to
violate Swedish internal and territorial waters as late as
mid 1992 [Ref. 5]. (The Swedish government has authorized
force to be used against foreign submarines within their
internal waters for ten years but have failed to make a
successful prosecution. A significant number of these
violations have been within Sweden's coastal archipelago,
i.e., central Stockholm --- inside the territorial base
line. [Ref. 29:p. 80]) Writes Johan Tunberger, Director of
Studies, and Robert Dalsjo, Senior Research Associate, of
Sweden's National Defense Research Establishment (FOA):
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Somewhat paradoxically, Sweden's activity in the
naval arms control arena and related issues increased
in the same period, apparently unaffected by the
submarine intrusions. Traditionally, questions
concerning the freedom of action of naval forces have
been the domain of the specialists in international
law. In the 1980s Sweden became a more active
proponent of naval arms control, primarily within the
United Nations, a tendency motivated by a desire to
keep all the concerned parties talking to each other.
[Ref. 28:p. 158]
Recent writings from FOA emphasize, however, the
importance of CSBMs which diverge from the "legalistic"
approach to arms control, particularly for naval arms
control. They view naval arms control measures as not
emendable to the inspections and verifications of the
variety used in Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) for example.
Tunberger and Dalsjo emphasize the necessity of keeping the
arms control efforts focused on the strategic equation,
which implies a limit on the worth and effectiveness of
regional agreements, such as those confined to the Baltic or
Nordic area:
We therefore, submit that any serious evaluation of the
impact of naval developments, including naval arms
control, must be carried out bearing in mind the effects
of air power on the Nordic area and the surrounding
maritime regions. As a consequence security issues in
the Baltic region cannot be divorced analytically from
those of the wider Nordic area [Ref. 28:p. 159].
The delineation of the Baltic region for specific
arms control measures was long a Soviet goal, and one
resisted by Sweden. Continue Tunberger and Dalsjo, Soviet
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media articles in the early 1980s frequently admonished
Sweden:
... for not being friendly to the Soviet Union and not
doing more in the field of disarmament---specifically,
dropping the condition that the Baltic Sea must be
included in a [broader] Nordic nuclear weapon free zone
(NWFZ). On the other had, the Swedish Government was
often praised in somewhat patronizing fashion for good
behavior in the arms control field in general. [Ref. 28:p.
1641
The failure to induce Western nations to agree to
naval arms control measures induced Sweden to champion
multilateral Incidents at Sea Agreements. This multilateral
approach is "in line with the traditional credo of Swedish
disarmament policy, namely that disarmament should be
multilateral and not decided over the heads of smaller
states." [Ref. 28:p. 171] However, Sweden has ben willing
to adopt bilateral agreements when expedient.
3. Nuclear Issues
Domestic political restraints have persisted in the
formation of nuclear security policy in all the Nordic
nations and were developed earlier than similar sentiments
in Central Europe. Writes Professor Nils Andren, a long
noted writer on Nordic security issues, currently at the
Swedish Institute for International Affairs:
Nuclear issues play and have played an important role in
all four major Nordic countries. In the late 1950s Sweden
seemed to be moving into the role of a minor nuclear
power, when strong movements both inside and outside the
established party structure forced the politicians.. .to
think twice.. .gradually leading to an almost universal
acceptance of the present nonnuclear defense. [Ref. 30:p.
93]
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Most Western scholars agree that Sweden enjoyed de
facto protection from Soviet nuclear blackmail by the US
nuclear guarantee to her NATO Nordic neighbors. Though
Sweden has long had the technological base to build nuclear
weapons, such an option would be as politically feasible
today in Sweden as the reintroduction of slavery.
The late 1970s again brought focus to nuclear
aspects of security policy in domestic politics, as well as
nuclear safety issues distinct from security policy [Ref.
31:p. 153]. However, attention has been diverted in recent
years from concern with its own domestic nuclear power
industry to the much graver danger of nuclear disaster next
door from the former Soviet Union. There is also an
awareness within and out of government that Sweden,
particularly in a time of severe economic troubles, can not
do without its existing nuclear power infrastructure [Ref.
22].
Sweden has been active internationally in attempts
to establish a nuclear non-proliferation regime, and in
concert with the US, Australia and Canada has gone beyond
basic requirements of controlling the export of nuclear
material and development technology by prohibiting such
exports to nations that have not placed all facilities under
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) oversight [Ref.
32: p. 299]. Sweden has also recently been active in
international efforts to assist states in the former Soviet
25
Union, with an explicitly declared concentration of effort
in the Baltic states, to improve nuclear safety practices.
Of special priority has been assistance in improving the
safety standards at the Lithuanian Ignalina nuclear power
plant [Ref. 33]. An expert committee tasked by the
government to recommend policy on nuclear and proliferation
issues suggested support for former Soviet republics seeking
to reduce nuclear weapons on their territory, assistance for
Swedish experts attempting to improve safety in nuclear
power plants (particularly in the Baltic, Belarus and
adjacent Russian region), support for IAEA attempts to
prevent the transfer of fissionable material, and the
promotion of a broader international concept of security
[Ref. 34].
Concern for the environmental effects from the
crumbling nuclear infrastructure of the former Soviet Union,
particularly in the Baltic states and Poland, is in fact
viewed as a "security" threat. The government has
appropriated $41 million for assistance in environmental
improvements to the Baltic states [Ref. 35]. The Swedes
along with the Finns and Norwegians are well aware of there
geographical proximity to the Kola Peninsula and the high
probability that the Kola will became the world's biggest
radio-active scrap heap. Schori emphasizes the need for an
international co-operative framework for approaching the
pending ecological disaster on the Kola Peninsula:
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On the Kola Peninsula we have the largest concentration of
nuclear reactors in the world with between 200 and 250
reactors on civilian and military ships and four reactors
on land. Here we also find enormous amounts of
radioactive fuel and waste, and several thousands nuclear
warheads and missiles....
All this means a disaster for nature and man, and it
also means a ticking ecological bomb for all of us in
Northern Europe. By herself Russia cannot tackle these
problems. [Ref. 25:p. 18]
Another aspect of Swedish views on nuclear issues is
the rise in "criminality" in the Baltic states and Russia,
and the potential there for criminal "warlords" to obtain
nuclear weapons amidst the political and economic chaos.
During interviews there appeared little awareness or
interest in the potential for the Bush Administrations
global protection against limited strike (GPALS) proposal or
the tactical ballistic missile defense (TBMD) capability the
US Navy could provide in the Baltic in the event of such a
crisis.
The Nordic nuclear free weapon zone (NFWZ) was first
proposed by the Soviets in 1958 and was a direct response to
NATO deployment of intermediate range ballistic missiles
(IRBMs) in Britain [Ref. 36:p. 270]. The proposal was
ultimately rejected but surveys in late 1984 showed that
majorities in all five Nordic parliaments as well as their
respective populations approved of the NWFZ concept.
Sweden attempted to link the NWFZ issue to arms
control in a broader European context in the late 1970s. A
1983 speech by Prime Minister Palme voiced some continued
support, but proposed that all weapons capable of targeting
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nations in the zone also be eliminated, thus linking the
NWFZ to intermediate nuclear force (INF) negotiations [Ref.
37:p. 71. A formal NFWZ in Scandinavia was especially
attractive to the Soviets in that such a treaty would
provide the strategic bonus of fueling pacifist sentiment in
Central Europe [Ref. 38:p. 74]. The US has always opposed
the NWFZ because it would restrict strategically significant
naval operations by, "prohibiting the presence, port call
and transit of ships and aircraft carrying nuclear weapons
[Ref. 39:p. 1]. The initiative remains fundamentally flawed
by Russian refusal to accept attenuation of the zone to her
own territory.
The establishment of the NWFZ still remains
unlikely, though it also remains unlikely to disappear in
domestic politics. The proposal is still viewed as useful
by a large constituency in the Nordic Parliaments in terms
of furthering arms control dialogue in general. It is also
now being recast under the influence of "Green" movements
within the Baltic states as proposals to denuclearize the
Baltic [Ref. 40:p. 63]. But it is significant to note that
amongst most defense thinkers, the NWFZ is a dead issue.
Due to the collapse of the Baltic fleet's nuclear capability
and because of the US and Russian policies for the
"...removal of non-strategic nuclear weapons from ships has
transmogrified the NWFZ issue from impossible to virtually
irrelevant." [Ref. 41:p. 24]
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4. Current Thinking on Arms Control
The Swedes have long contributed significantly to
research and writing on arms control and confidence and
security building measures (CSBMs). However, recent
emphasis on CSBMs, particularly from defense researchers,
has a much different meaning. In an interview in June of
1993 with Royal Swedsih Navy Captain Lars Wedin of the Joint
Defense Staff (JDS) (the highest echelon of four defense
staffs), who is the advisor to the JDS on CSCE and
Disarmament, CSBMs are seen as a way to cooperate with the
West through military exchanges without creating an unwanted
and possibly destructive domestic political backlash [Ref.
21). In a January 1993 FOA pre-paper, written jointly by
Dalsjo, Tunberger and Wedin, the three conclude that
"utopian" arms control approaches are a dead issue:
In sum, naval arms control must be studied on its own
conditions - in light of strategic and environmental
trends and facts. The traditional approach which stressed
structural disarmament and navalized CSBMs should be
dismissed from the agenda. Instead, a broader perspective
on arms control should be taken, where the basic
characteristics of navies form the point of departure.
[Ref. 41:p. 36]
A May 1993 FOA pre-print paper by Dalsjo, Tunberger
and Hans Zettermark, FOA analyst for European Security
Studies, warns that a naval arms control accord be reached
between Russia and the Western maritime nations that hampers
naval access and flexibility it could threaten NATO security
guarantees to Denmark and Norway (and by strategic
extension, threaten Sweden). "Equally important , it could
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also foster a perception that the Nordic states belonged in
a 'legitimate' Russian sphere of influence." [Ref. 42:p. 161
Margaretha af Ugglas, Sweden's Foreign Minister and
current Chairperson of the CSCE, articulated a policy of
continueing to work within the UN and CSCE with a priority
on "arms control" rather than "disarmarment" and greater
weight attached to Sweden's identity as a "European" state
than as a non-aligned state [Ref. 32].
The real point now,, if not explicit in formal
literature, in the continued Swedish defense discussion
among military professionals of arms control measures such
as CBSMs through international organizations such as the
CSCE, the UN and Council of Europe, is that they provide a
mechanism for the Swedish defense community to participate
and demonsttate a useful contribution to global, but
primarily, European security, while still remaining outside
of a formal alliance. There has been a "cultural
revolution" beginning in 1991 in the training of Swedish
officers, which is now reflected in Officer 2000, a training
manual that stresses the need for language skills and at
least one tour abroad for promotion to senior rank. The
CSCE Vienna Document 1992 emphasis on military exchanges has
given force to this movement. This requirement is a
dramatic departure for what has traditionally been a
relatively insular officer corps. [Ref. 21]
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I1. STRATEGIC PERCEPTIONS
A. COLD WAR OVERVIEW
Interviews with Swedish Defense analysts at FOA and with
military officers on the Joint Staff and The Armed Forces
Staff and War College indicate general concurrence with the
common US view of the strategic significance of the Nordic
states during the Cold War years. In summary, dating from
the Murmansk supply run of World War II, the Northern axis
was significant for US and Soviet planners, but until the
late 1970s and early 1980s, the focus of confrontation was
Central Europe (Ref. 43:p. 1]. At that time the
significance of the Arctic and North West TVD (NWTVD)
appears to have increased in Soviet strategic planning for
several reasons. The buildup on the Kola peninsula of the
Soviet strategic ballistic missile nuclear submarine (SSBN)
fleet and supporting infrastructure directly enhanced the
value of the region for Soviet nuclear war fighting. The
strategic significance of the Northern Flank can only have
been further accentuated to the Soviet General Staff by the
US Maritime strategy of the 1980s [Ref. 44:p. 23) A summary
of this view is provided by Dr. Gordon McCormick of the
Naval Postgraduate School in a January 1990 RAND paper:
Failure to control both northern Norway and the western
Baltic Sea could seriously endanger Soviet war plans in
any future war in Europe, severely restriction Soviet
military options.. .and opening up the possibility of
allied flanking operation against Soviet lines of
reinforcement and supply in central Europe. Although
these considerations have always been sources of concern
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It seems plausible that military considerations were the
most important at the beginning of the submarine
incidents, and that political motives played a bigger role
as the military rational for the incursions diminished,
and as the political impact of the incursions (in Sweden)
was found to be favorable.. .a policy (Soviet) aiming at a
change of Sweden's (and the region's) policies in the
direction of greater dependency on the USSR and less of
an emphasis on deterrence....
The USSR hopes (by the submarine campaign) to attain
both an increased ability to execute a surprise attack on
Sweden in case of war, and a Swedish security policy that
is more in tune with Soviet regional ambitions. [Ref.
47:p. 47].
1. The Principle of Marginality
Swedish security has traditionally stressed the
concept of marginality, that is that a militarily strong
Sweden capable of defending her borders in all directions
will be able to avoid involvement in a great power war.
This concept holds that an aggressor would only have minimal
forces to devote to Sweden because of a much greater
engagement in other theaters, and therefore, would be
discouraged by Sweden's strong regional capabilities. A
corollary of "marginality" is rigid adherence to Sweden's
nonalignment and neutrality policy to reassure this
aggressor (historically clearly the Soviet Union) that
Sweden's territory could not be used by any state involved
in the conflict for an advantage [Ref. 5:p. 221. Though
during the eighties there were some statements from the
Social Democratic government about the need to shoot down US
cruise missiles launched from the Norwegian Sea enroute the
Soviet Union in the event of war, there has been little
apparent effort by the military to develop such an intercept
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capability. Discussions with military officers did not
explicitly confirm this, but left the impression that such
statements were largely a rhetorical exercise. In any
event, Sweden's Air Early Warning (AEW) assets are
conspicuously located along her Eastern borders [Ref. 48:p.
23]. In 1990 former US Ambassador to Sweden, Rodney-
Kennedy-Minott, writes in Lonely Path to Follow:
Sweden quite properly shies away from any allegations that
it serves as an auxiliary for NATO. This a charge that
the Soviets have leveled on occasion. In fact, from a
NATO perspective, a well-armed but non-aligned
Sweden provides a well defended back door to NATO's
Northwestern flank. [Ref. 49:p. 141
But it was probably natural in Sweden for many to
overestimate their "strategic" significance to the super
powers. Dr. Bo Huldt, at the Swedish Institute of
International Affairs (SIIA), identifies supports this
point, "The Nordic countries..,tend to exaggerate the degree
to which they play a central role in superpower policies."
[Ref. 50:p. 15] The preponderance of literature arising
from Moscow after the break up of the Soviet Union indicates
that despite somewhat extraordinary Swedish efforts over the
decades to distance themselves diplomatically from the US --
- the Soviet Union always considered Sweden a NATO ally and
planned accordingly. In the November 10, 1990 Dagens
Nyheter article, "We Reckoned Sweden as Part of the West,"
Serge Morgatjov, General USSR retired and a specialist on
Swedish and Nordic security policy, confirms that the
Soviets were well aware of bilateral US-Swedish security
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agreements, as well as similar Swedish agreements with West
Germany, Norway, France, Denmark, Canada, and other
neutrals. The following are excerpts of some of Morgatjov's
main points:
I am not surprised that there is a certain amount of
military cooperation between Sweden and the USA. What
does surprise me... is the fact that it is reported as
news! ...
Is this sort of cooperation compatible with Swedish
'non-align ýnt policy?' My answer to this is: It
doesn't conflict with it since Swedish neutrality
concept - neither in actual fact nor in official
interpretation - was ever designed in terms of symmetry of
relations between blocs.
A sadly ironical factor in Sweden's post-war
relations with the Soviet Union is that even if her
military bloc relations had been absolutely sterile,
Soviet military circles would nevertheless have regarded
Sweden's military capacity as part of that of the West...
I hope I don not disappoint FRA personnel if I state
that their cooperation with the USA did not make much
difference at the European level. It did not create any
special additional military threat to the Soviet Union.
[Ref. 51:pp. 20-21]
Alexi Arbatov, the current Russian Head of the
Department of Disarmament of the Institute of World
Economic and International Relations (IMEMO), expresses a
similar view, that the General Staff of the Soviet Army and
Navy " ... had an extremely bipolar concept of the strategic
environment." [Ref. 52:p. 46] Force deployments to the
Northern Flank by US forces in support of NATO allies were
viewed as the:
... forward echelon of an offensive US military
presence directed against the USSR.
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.whenever assessing the balance of forces, the
Soviet Ministry of Defense always treated the forces of US
allies on an equal basis with US units.
Soviet military thinking did not make clear-cut
distinctions between conventional and nuclear war




The classic Swedish military planning scenario for
decades after World War II was to be able to discourage a
Soviet amphibious attack on Swedish territory in an attempt
to seize the Danish straits and a land corridor to Northern
Norwegian air bases. Such an attack was anticipated in
conjunction with the a Warsaw Pact - NATO confrontation.
This scenario gradually gave way to the realization of
Swedish vulnerability to a coup do main style surprise
attack. Ingemar Dorfer, writing in 1989, details the
challenges to the traditional scenario in during the final
few years of the Cold War:
Recent Soviet naval developments have focused
attention on northern Europe and increased the tension in
the area.... the classic Swedish defense doctrine of
marginality - it is not marginally wise for the Soviet
Union to devote its scarce military resources to
attacking Sweden as well as NATO - is thereby
effectively challenged.
The naval threat in the Baltic conforms more closely
to traditional Swedish scenarios. Since in a war the
major mission of the Baltic Fleet will be to seize the
Danish Straits, Swedish territory very likely will be
violated. The other possible strategic mission - to seize
air bases and harbors in Norway and Western Sweden -
coincides with the classic Swedish threat scenario of a
Soviet invasion across the Baltic against a mobilized
Swedish Army of 30 brigades and a navy and air force on
full alert. The new elements here would be the swiftness
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and power of Soviet surprise attack coupled with the use
of Spetznaz and diversionary forces to secure key areas.
[Ref. 53:p. 201)
2. Current Thinking... Revolutionary Change?
The collapse of the Soviet Union carried with it the
demise of much of the above scenarios. However, though the
capabilities of the now Russian Northern and particularly
Baltic Fleet have declined precipitously, Russia is, and is
likely to continue to be the preponderant military force in
the region. It is the political not military changes in the
region that have been the most dramatic. Independence of
the Baltic states, as well as Poland's release from the
defunct Warsaw Pact has contributed to creation a new and
still unstable regional climate. The old Soviet Baltic
Military District has been abolished but Russian forces
remain in the now sovereign Baltic republics, though there
is a schedule for their removal [Ref. 54:p. 641.
Russian concerns over the inevitable rise of
Swedish, and particularly German influence in the Baltic
will likely impact the formation of new Russian strategic
concepts [Ref. 55:p. 63]. Though there is a general
European perception, also held by many in Sweden, that the
Russian threat is declining regionally as it recedes
globally, there is a counter view in Sweden and Norway,
coined the "sausage theory", that the strategic significance
of the Nordic region actually is increasing for the
Russians, as there military complexes on the Kola Peninsula
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(particularly the strategic ballistic nuclear submarines
(SSBNs) of the Northern Fleet) shoulders relatively more of
Russian strategic capabilities [Ref. 6:p. 2]. Additionally,
this significance is likely to be further enhanced if
current indications are correct and "the major portion, or
all, of the remaining Russian strategic submarines will be
based in the Northern Fleet." [Ref. 6:p. 3] A corollary of
this theory is that as Russian capability to project
military power declines overall, they may be more likely to
project it where they retain a favorable correlation of
forces, i.e., the North Flank. States Prime Minister Bildt
in his introduction to the 1992 Government Defense Policy
Bill:
Seen in thi: background it is essential that Swedish
security policy should include a long-term scenario in
which, in the first place, Russia wishes to apply major
security interests in our vicinity with renewed energy.
A Russia of this nature would probably be in a relatively
weak position in a general European perspective... (but)
would have very considerable military potential at its
disposal in our immediate vicinity. [Ref. 56:p. 20]
Such a potential is particularly threatening to Sweden in
light of the unstable internal Russian political and
economic condition and potential reactionary Russian action
to protect Russian ethnic minorities in the Baltic states.
Interestingly, the Scandinavian "sausage theory" bears a
marked resemblance to the old British view that the Imperial
Russia was most likely to expand in Central Asia when the
balance of power thwarted its ambitions in Europe [Ref.
57:p. 162].
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Defense Minister Bjork further substantiates
continued concern over Russian capabilities, which as a
result of Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), have
at least in raw numbers of high value platforms, recently
increased. He also establishes the point that a "weakened
Russia" could actually pose an even greater threat in the
Baltic region:
The Kola Peninsula is a central factor in Russia's
defense.... In a war situation we can assume that the
Russians may try to establish a protected zone to the west
of their borders which, as we know, is where Sweden and
certain other countries happen to be situated....
The greater part (of) offensive air strike forces of
the former Soviet Union are still based in western
Russia.... In fact the number of high-quality heavy and
medium-heavy fighter-bombers in our vicinity has actually
increased somewhat. [Ref. 58:pp. 10-11]
However, belief in the validity of the sausage
theozy is not universal in Sweden. Schori down played the
theory and expressed little concern over residual Russian
military capability in the short term. Schori's also holds
the view that the threat of surprise attack, acknowledging a
longtime tenent of Swedish security policy, has gone [Ref.
13]. On this matter, the threat of a theater level surprise
attack, Schori varies little from the official Government
view. States Prime Minister Bildt in his introduction to
the 1991-92 Defense Bill, "The Soviet Union has ceased to
exist as a unified state as has its military capacity for a
massive surprise attack on Western Europe." [Ref. 56:p. 2]
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But long term concern with Russian military
capabilities will remain a permanent fixture of Swedish
Security policy. Prime Minister Bildt elaborates:
... the military strategic situation in North Western
Europe and the surrounding sea area remains broadly
unchanged. Despite the possibility of significant
quantitative reductions, strategic nuclear weapons
continue to fulfill their ultimate function as far as the
United States and Russia are concerned. For this and
other reasons, major naval strategic interests have their
intersection in our vicinity. Russia's strategic air
defense interests to the north west are also probably of
a permanent nature. [Ref. 56:p. 2]
Threats from the East are not only viewed in terms
of military attack. Informal discussions with Swedish
defense professionals indicated that long term strategic
planning focuses on three possible scenarios for the future
of the Russian Republic: (1) continued gradual move to a
free market economy and democratic institutions; (2)
economic chaos and a resultant rise in criminal "warlords,"
possibly with nuclear weapons and; (3) a reactionary
takeover. In all three scenarios the strategic and
environmental nuclear threats on the Kola Peninsula will
remain. The possibility of the latter two negative
scenarios has effected security policy in the sense that
fostering economic and political stability in the former
Soviet Union, particularly in the Baltic states, is
considered a "security" objective. Additionally, force
planning is considering budgeting options to develop a
better intercept capability to meet a potential "flood of
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refugees" from the East. In this sense, the $41 million
allocated in 1992 for aid to refugees is viewed as
furthering "security" objectives [Ref. 59]. [Ref. 5]
3. Theater Studies
Major Marco Smedberg (a Royal Swedish Army Reserve
Officer an independent consultant on ground force tactics
and doctrine), Robert Dalsjo and Hans Zettermark's in a FOA
pre-print, "The Effects of CFE on Capabilities to Wage War
in the North," of May 1993, outlines three speculative
scenarios for future Russian offensive operations in the
Nordic region. The most significant assumptions of these
scenarios is that NATO still exists, CFE reductions have
been implemented, the Kaliningrad Ooblast is still a
significant Russian base, Russian troops have been withdrawn
from the Baltics, Russian forces are smaller but more
effective, the Baltic states have their own territorial
forces, and the Nordic defense forces are similar but
smaller than those now existing. [Ref. 60:p. 21]
In Case 1 the Russians attempt a rapid seizure of
the Baltic states and Sweden's Gotland island to either
create a defensive zone during a crisis with the West or an
attempt for international or domestic reasons to demonstrate
strength by reestablishing some of the old order.
Deception, speed and surprise would be key to securing
Gotland to create a fait accompli. Extensive use would be
41
made of electronic warfare and airborne or airmobile
elements. [Ref. 60:p. 21]
In a discussion with Hans Zeetermark and Robert
Dalsjo both expressed deep and sincere concern that the
West's failure to provide a united and vigorous response to
Serbian aggression in the former Yugoslavia was a very
dangerous precedent; particularly in that it sent the wrong
signal to the wrong people in Moscow [Ref. 12]. This
concern is evident in a citation from this first Baltic
scenario as well as outlining a key role for the US in
Swedish security:
The reaction of "third parties" could thus be a
critical factor in this type of operation. If the West's
feeble attempts in Yugoslavia were to set the tone for the
future, an aggressive regime in Moscow might not take the
risk of active intervention very seriously. However,
political conditions can change rapidly and a deployment
of western - especially US - aircraft to air bases in
Sweden could upset the strategic calculus... its execution
as well as its aims. [Ref. 60:p. 23]
For the success of this particular scenario, the Kaliningrad
enclave is critical for a rapid assault on Gotland and
a Russian - Balarus alliance would significantly improve
Russian capabilities to quickly move substantial forces
into the Baltic states. [Ref. 60:p. 23]
The objective of Came 2 is a Coup de Main on
Stockholm with limited forces to paralyze the country and
preempt effective Swedish resistance. A Russian success in
this operation would alter the entire strategic calculus of
Northern Europe. Control of Swedish air bases would allow
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the Russians to strike the United Kingdom and the continent,
neutralize Norway and interdict sea lines of communication
(SLOCs) in the North Atlantic. Only limited troops would be
used, "The lack of numbers and of 'heaviness' can partly be
made up for by unconventional means - such as spetznaz,
sleeping agents and Trojan horses, and by the use of cruise
missiles, PGMs and air support." (Ref. 60:p. 24] Surprise
being critical, such an attack would have to occur before a
move into the Baltic states to forestall Swedish
mobilization. Furthermore, the Russians might seek to
reduce the risk of war with the US and its allies would be
to make it clear that only Sweden, still not supported by
any military alliance, is the target of attack. This
scenario would seek to exploit the fact that there are
virtually no active units in the Swedish army. The Navy and
Air Force, which do have active forces, would have to be
neutralized at the outset. In this scenario, "Swedish
abilities in intelligence and decision-making would play a
crucial role." [Ref. 60:p. 25] Concern for such a threat
can be seen in Defense Minister Anders Bjorck's speech in
London on September 1992, "In an era of increasingly high
tech warfare, it is vital to be able to follow an aggressors
movements at an early stage, and to hit back before he
reaches Sweden." [Ref. 58:p. 11]
The CFE Treaty is seen to have a mixed influence on
possibility for Russian success in such an attack. Though
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CFE limits restrict air transport capability and armored
vehicles in air borne units (but not the number of units) it
may only foster lighter, more mobile units. Additionally
the disorder in the former Soviet Union may make it easier
for unusual preparatory troop movements to be
misinterpreted. The key role of tactical surprise in the
German attack on Norway in 1940, which succeeded despite low
troop strength and some intelligence warning, is noted. But
also obvious is that, "The map clearly indicates that
Russia's starting position for an attack upon Stockholm has
been seriously weakened by the withdrawal from the Baltic
States (a scenario assumption)." [Ref. 60:pp. 25-26)
In Case 3 Russia attack to occupy all of Finland and
Northern Norway. Motivation for such offensive action might
be an attempt to establish a protective zone for the bulk of
its strategic assets in the Kola Base complex and patrol
areas for the Northern Fleet SSBNs. An attack on Sweden is
not essential in this case but would allow Russian ground
forces to bypass the Norwegian defenses at Lyngen by passing
through the remote "parrot beak" northernmost tip of Sweden.
But for such a Russian move on a NATO member, "the risk of
American involvement must weigh heavily." [Ref. 60:p. 27]
Surprise would not be as critical in this scenario,
but suppression of Norwegian air bases to prevent US
reinforcement would require substantial strike air assets.
But though this scenario probably would allow for success
44
against Finland it would probably not be able to secure
control of Troms in Northern Norway, "the forces available
on Kola, within CFE limits, appear to small for a Russian
ground offensive to reach strategically significant areas,
while such parts of Finnmark that could reasonably taken
seem of little strategic significance." [Ref. 60:p. 29] One
conceivable but very risky method of securing Troms would be
an airborne - airmobile assisted assault, which would still
have to wait for ground forces to link up [Ref. 60:p. 291.
In conclusion, the cited scenario study considers
that the traditional large and rapid attack scenarios "that
have figured so prominently in Nordic threat perceptions
seems irrelevant for the future, unless the CFE Treaty
breaks down or is violated." [Ref. 60:p. 29] Therefore
support of the CFE is advisable for Sweden. However there
are significant caveats. CFE will reinforce a trend to
smaller but more powerful and mobile units and the
capability disparity between standing forces and mobilizing
units will increase. Destabilization might increase the
temptation for a surprise attack but could be offset by
increased transparency in military affairs fostered by the
CFE Treaty. Lastly, "The three hypothetical cases outlined
above indicate that adherence to CFE would not necessarily
rule out a Russian capability for offensive operations in
the region - if such operations are based on surprise,
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speed, mobility and quality of units, rather than on mass."
[Ref. 60:p. 30]
Additional relevant implications of the CFE Treaty
on NATOs North Flank are developed in the Norwegian edition
of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
Military Balance 1992-93. This editions rendition of the
strategic balance in the North is held in high regard by
Dalsjo and Zettermark. There are some interesting Nordic
interpretations:
After the Russian withdrawals, and the CFE Treaty in 1990,
it is no longer considered that there exists a threat of
surprise attack and major offensive operations against the
Central region of NATO. The Alliance is therefore not
likely to give as high priority as previously to
reinforcements which may contribute to holding Norwegian
territory in the North in a possible conflict.
As a result of developments in Russia and Central
and Eastern Europe the line of confrontation in a possible
conflict has been moved considerably further East in the
Baltic area. The composition of the Russian Baltic Fleet
seems to indicate that the task has been to achieve
control of the Baltic Sea and to support ground forces in
contiguous land areas. In the new situation and with the
independence of the Baltic states, it may become the new
task of Russian Baltic Fleet to contribute to a forward
control and defense of Russia's own territory. [Ref. 6:p.
4]
C. STRATEGIC PERCEPTION OF THE US
With the gradual drawback in US naval exercises and
operations in the North Atlantic and Norwegian Sea there is
Swedish concern, that in the long term, a power vacuum may
develop in the North. A traditional tenent of Swedish
strategic thinking has been the need for a balance along the
Northern or "Atlantic" axis. After the post-War decline of
the United Kingdom, the US is seen as the only power capable
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of offsetting Russian predominance in that region. Though
not often said in public (though more freely stated today)
it is in Sweden's national interest for a viable US
strategic presence in the North Atlantic.
An aspect of this perception can be seen in the "Nordic
Bloc" component of a "common European security system"
proposed by the Supreme Commander Bengt Gustafsson.
Underlying the Supreme Commander's logic of a Nordic Bloc is
something far different from the Swedish proposal for a
common Nordic defense of the late 1940's. Presently, rather
than an attempt to minimize a defense link with a superpower
(US), the current goal of a "Nordic bloc" is to retain the
Atlantic (US) link within a united Europe. The Supreme
Commander has expressed the view that the post-Cold War
strategic regime that is emerging is for Sweden merely a
return to the historical three centers of power axis':
Southern --- Europe (EC); Western (US); and Eastern
(Russia). He expresses concern about the priority the
Central European powers, i.e., the Germans and French, would
give to defending Northern Scandinavia. A "European Pillar"
to NATO could certainly play a useful role in the broader
aspects of Sweden's security policy after EC integration,
but is not viewed as sufficient to counter the long term
potential threat remaining on the Kola Peninsula. Within
the EC the Supreme Commander felt Sweden should "slowdown"
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the process of forming an independent European security
structure (without the US). [Ref. 26]
Similar statements were made by the senior military
commander in Norway and Finland shortly afterward. It should
be pointed out that the concept of a Nordic Bloc was
denounced by many on the left, including Schori, and even
required a mild rebuke from the Defense Minister [Ref. 24].
In off the record remarks with defense professionals there
was evident skepticism that the French and Germans would, or
even could defend Sweden. Thomas-Durell Young's study for
the Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College,
writes that such concerns are not particular to Sweden:
"There is.. .a real need to reassure the allies on the flanks
that their security interests are not being ignored at a
time when the threat to the Central Front has diminished."
[Ref. 61:pp. 37-38]
It may seem puzzling as to why Sweden, which was not a
NATO member during the Cold War, should champion a continued
strong US link to European security - of which it will now
become an integral part. Much of the answer lies in the
fact that Sweden has long had a discreet security
relationship with the US [Ref. 7:p. 364]. Paul Cole argues
further in his dissertation that Sweden overestimated its
own significance to US planners, assuming that the US would
come to Sweden's defense, regardless of its "nonalignment"
with NATO:
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An isolated Soviet attack on Sweden or a violation of
Sweden's security interests was of no direct concern to
the United States. Throughout the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s
Sweden continued to base its security policy on the
anticipation of U.S. support in the event of Soviet
aggression. This extended into nuclear strategy as well
as Sweden asserted that the United States would risk
nuclear war on Sweden's behalf.... [Ref. 7:p. 379]
D. SWEDEN AS A REGIONAL POWER
Senior naval officers have made public statements to the
effect that "showing the flag" in the Baltic has gained new
importance as a mission as the Russian Baltic Fleet recedes
in capability and operational tempo. Such statements shave
been severely attacked in the press. Schori characterized
such sentiment as being strong in the current government
which, ". .. would like very much to be the new sheriff of the
Baltic." [Ref. 13] Colonel Bo Hugemark of the Royal Staff
and War College envisions a Nordic-Baltic defense system
where Sweden would be the "regional great power" within a
Western European Union (WEU) structure that serves as the
military arm of the EC, which in turn remains integrated
with NATO (US) [Ref. 62:p. 5]. Colonel Hugemark also
stresses than many strategists underestimate the significant
role even small but well trained, equipped and organized
militaries of the Baltic states could play in the region
[Ref. 62:p. 3].
Defense Minister Bjorck has made a note of emphasizing,
however, that Sweden can not assume the responsibility for
the military security of the Baltic states and does not wish
to engender false hope. Radar, communication and other
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"non-lethal" equipment is being provided, but not heavy
armaments. Finland has been the forerunner in the training
of Baltic security forces but Sweden has been conducting a
security course for a small group of Estonians emphasizing
crisis management, ethics and leadership. [Ref. 63]
Within the Nordic region Sweden has always been viewed,
if not a bully, something of a "condescending big brother"
by the other states. With collapse of old bipolar strategic
environment, Sweden, traditionally the strongest industrial
and military nation in the Nordic community, does appear to
some, as relatively enhanced in strategic status. But it is
obvious to many in Sweden, as it is in Russia and the
Baltics states, that the real long term potential threat of
a hegemonic "sheriff" comes from Germany. A strong Swedish
naval "forward presence," which includes "showing the flag
missions," could serve a useful role in mitigating those
fears and furthering a cooperative regional maritime
security structure. This is supported by Steven E. Miller,
Senior Researcher at the Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI) until 1991, and currently
Director of Studies for Science and International Affairs
(CSIA) at the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard
University:
The political geography of the Baltic region has
changed substantially in the past several years as a
result of the unification of Germany and the achievement
of independence by Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The
changing political circumstances.. .have also intensified
i-terest in, and probably increased the feasibility of,
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co-operation in the Baltic, so the idea of some sort of
regional security arrangement, including naval forces,
remains on the agenda.
Indeed, with the collapse of cold war frictions in the
area, the likelihood of Baltic co-operation on naval
matters and other security issues seems fairly high.
[Ref. 64:p. 10]
Such a security structure would likely be limited to
policing, search and rescue, environmental safety, and
importantly, refugee assistance and/or control --- missions
more in line with the US Coast Guard and Customs than with
the Navy. [Ref. 5]
There is a history, however, of Sweden attempting a lead
a Nordic military alliance. In the immediate post World War
II era Sweden attempted to form a common defensive alliance
outside of, and in reaction to, NATO, which "...on the whole
consistently followed a long established tradition in
pursuing the policy of non-alignment between power blocs."
[Ref. 30:p. 92] The initiative failed, primarily as a
result of Norwegian concerns, having like Denmark suffered
German occupation, that Sweden could not provide a viable
military deterrent to the Soviet Union (Ref. 65:p. 51].
This underling weakness to any such Nordic alliance has not
changed. But what is significant to clarify to regional
analysts and planners is that the current "Nordic Block"
debate is an attempt by the Supreme Commanders in the Nordic
states to implicitly align themselves with the US as a
security guarantee and hedge against a European centered and
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lead security alliance; particularly if such a security
structure supplants NATO [Ref. 66].
The Finns in particular have expressed interest in
coordinating military planning, particularly in procurement
with Sweden and have shown interest in a joint air defense
effort (Ref. 67]. The Nordic states have long coordinated
planning on UN peace-keeping efforts, and Sweden has just
recently disclosed the existence of previously secret
contingency planning with the other Nordic states at the




Sweden historically has pursued a security policy which
has emphasized the avoidance of alliances to ensure
neutrality in war. This policy emphasized the separatenems
of the Nordic region during the Cold War. In an attempt to
diffuse difficult security issues, heavy reliance was placed
on international institutions as a means to reduce the bi-
polarity of the super power competition. More directly, "A
traditional Swedish position is to avoid bilateral
agreements which could give one great power a droit do
regard over Swedish policy; the call for multilateral
agreement is in line with this doctrine." [Ref. 28:p. 170]
The end of the Cold War, brings into question the need
for a continued Swedish emphasis on international
institutions as a forum for a security policy which
accentuates Sweden's "difference" from Europe. For most of
the Cold War such forums were seen as a means of maintaining
an active engagement in world affairs while remaining on the
periphery of big power confrontation. But the Cold War's
end also allows Sweden the political freedom, both
internationally and domestically, to pursue direct
cooperation with Western states. This implies some
international organizations will be joined anew, some
approached with a changed emphasis, and perhaps, some
discarded. Prime Minister Bildt summarizes these
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developments in his introduction to the Swedish governments
1992 defense policy bill:
The Swedish security policy is changing in a Europe
which is in the process of change. A new political
situation also creates new opportunities for
participation in a foreign and security cooperation
with other European states. [Ref. 56:p. 1]
S. DIRUC? IIPACT OF EC IZRSHIP
Sweden, as has Finland, have applied for EC membership.
For both nations, this marks a significant departure from a
traditional policy of separateness from Central Europe.
Participation in the EC, will have an explicit impact on
security policies. Both have been asked to renounce their
neutrality policies by the EC Executive Body before
continuing membership talks [Ref. 68:p. A-5]. Subsequently
both Sweden's Prime Minister and the Defense Minister have
stated that the old policy of neutrality is gone. Both have
explicitly stated that Sweden is aware of the security
implications of its request to join the European Economic
Community (EC), and further, will not shy away from those
ramifications [Ref. 56:p. 9]. Prime Minister Bildt
acknowledges an awareness that, "...the EC appears to be an
increasingly independent factor in the security policy
sphere." [Ref. 56:p. 10] But Bildt also stresses that
"NATO, the WEU and the EC are not alternative structures in
the complex policy pattern now emerging in the West." [Ref.
56:p. 10] "Instead, together with the CSCE, the Council of
Europe and the recently formed North Atlantic Cooperation
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Council (NACC), they compliment each other as important
elements in a European security order." [Ref. 5 6 :p. 10]
For Sweden, "the Zuropean Commnity (EC) is the obvious
nucleus for European cooperation." [Ref. 56:p. 14] But it
is the following quote by the Prime Minister that best
reflects Swedish priorities:
A consistent theme in EC discussions of political union
has been the question of a common security and foreign
policy. It should be noted, however, that the term
'security policy' does not automatically have a
defensive policy dimension in an EC context.
[Ref. 56:p. 16]
Though accepting the implications of common security
goals as an EC member, in itself, a departure from Sweden's
traditional policy of separateness from the continent
(though not inconsistent with the traditional party position
of the Moderates), Bildt leamly does not view Sweden's XC
membership as participation in a apseudon military alliance:
... in the foreseeable future, EC member states will
probably implement their operative military cooperation
outside the EC framework. This does not detract from
the picture of the Community as an important
stabilizing factor in the security policy sphere in
Europe. The EC, in common with other European
institutions, including the CSCE, has a fundamental
role to pursue in the pan-European security system
which is now emerging. [Ref. 56:p. 17]
As the bipolar strategic regime fades Swedish security
policies are integrating with larger European security
questions, and therefore are likely to lose some of their
distinctiveness. However, this should not be overstated.
Sweden will retain distinctive characteristics in her
approach to security questions which will remain readily
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discernable. The less direct, but perhaps pivotal in the
long term, economic affect of integration with the continent
on the "politics" of security policy will be explored in
sections V and VI.
C. lNATO AND TE VlEU
Though acknowledging that America's relative power will
likely decrease within the NATO alliance, Bildt does not
equivocate on Sweden's view of a continued US role in
Europe:
... NATO will undergo substantial changes in terms of its
political role, military tasks and resources. However,
there is good reason to assume that, in the
foreseeable future, NATO will continue to be the
organization within which the West European states,
together with the United States and Canada, will
channel the major proportion of their defense policy
cooperation. [Ref. 56:p. 13]
The WEU is not viewed as a viable alternative to NATO:
In the foreseeable future, member countries (WEU) are
hardly likely to wish to duplicate NATO's functions
and, as regards defense of the NATO area, the United
States and EC countries will probably continue to hold
the view that this is purely a NATO responsibility.
[Ref. 56:p. 14]
Further, in regards to out of area operations (OOA)
under WEU command, such as European naval actions during
Desert Shield, it is Bildt's view that "...it is doubtful
whether European states have the political and military
capacity to act independently of the United States in such
situations." (Ref. 56:p. 14] The WEU is viewed as serving
the modest role of a "political compromise between
'Atlanticists' and 'Europeans'." [Ref. 56:p. 14]
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Unstated here, but central to this Swedish analysis, and
evident in much of the writings of the Defense Research
Establishment (FOA), is the continued inability of the WEU
to provide a nuclear deterrent to Russia comparable to the
US. Cooperations with NATO is a very politicized issue in
Swedish domestic politics. Many senior Swedish military
officers will privately express the desire to work more
closely, if not outright join NATO, but such views are
sedated by the realization that the time is not politically
opportune for such a step, and me be a long time in coming.
[Ref. 5]. In an interview on June 1993 at the Foreign
Ministry with Ingemar Dorfer, immediately after his return
from the Paris Air Show and visit to WEU headquarters, he
remarked that it is too early for Sweden to consider
applying for full observer status with the WEU (though more
closely affiliated neither Denmark or Norway are WEU member
states) [Ref. 16]. Questions on future collective security
arrangements will remain secondary agenda items until the
population approves the referendum on EC membership.
However, in the opinion of Bo Petersson, who has been
intimately involved with the politics of neutrality issues:
... at least for the time being, no political parties
propound formal ties to NATO. My personal idea is,
however, that such a discussion might well emerge in a
year or two. To my mind, the principal obstacles are not
too overwhelming. [Ref. 14]
Though obviously speculative, there are sound historic
and strategic reasons why a Sweden within NATO would be
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among the group of member states identified by Pierre
Lellouche which include, "...the British, who trust neither
the French nor the Germans, (and] stick to the American line
(along with the Dutch and the Scandinavian)." [Ref. 6 9:p.
125]
D. EXPANDING ROLE FOR THE CSCE
The CSCE, which Sweden now chairs, is probably the most
likely forum, outside of UN humanitarian and peacekeeping
operations, for Sweden to become actively engaged in
military cooperation with the West. Sweden has long been
active diplomatically within the CSCE. States Bildt:
... the CSCE now constitutes, on the one hand, a forum
for confirming the major security policy changes in
Europe and, on the other, the institutional framework
within which it as been possible to enter into
practical agreements regarding disarmament and
confidence-building measures. [Ref. 56:p. 25]
During the 1970s Swedish policy became actively involved
in building majorities with the Third World in the United
Nations Conference of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Significantly, writes Tunberger and Dalsjo, these Swedish
global diplomatic efforts in UNCLOS were easily transferred
to the new emerging CSCE forum:
The initial phases of the CSCE process took place when
the UNCLOS was under way. Within the CSCE framework,
Sweden, together with the other neutral and non-
aligned states (NNAs), unsuccessfully tried to include
independent naval activities in the scope of European
confidence building initiatives. [Ref. 28:p. 168]
The CSCE has been emphasized by Sweden and Finland as a
useful forum for addressing nuclear proliferation and other
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security issues. NBoth neutrals agree that the CSCE is the
natural forum for future continental security questions'."
[Ref. 70:p. 57] Additionally, in the changed military
environment, the CSCE has received recent affirmation as a
useful form for arms control by NATO [Ref. 71:p. 12].
Robert Dalsjo, Johan Tunberger and Lars Wedin of FOA
emphasize the usefulness of the CSCE as a framework to
coordinate Swedish military operations with other nations in
search and rescue (SAR), rules of engagement (ROE),
humanitarian efforts, and even direct military
interventions:
... one could easily imagine international exercises
outside the context of normal alliances - within the
CSCE for example...
The new political and strategic situation might
also call for joint naval operations outside the old
alliance structures, eg, for peacekeeping or peacemaking
purposes. [Ref. 41:p. 31]
The CSCE is seen as both a bridge for coordinating
clearly non-combative Swedish participation in naval
exercises outside of a formal alliance structure and as a
tool for CSBMs furthering the Swedish arms control agenda.
The Social Democrats have supported a policy of training and
maintaining a deployable force to participate in peace-
keeping and peace-enforcing missions for CSCE as well as UN
authorized operations. Government opposition stems
primarily from a policy goal of funding defense programs
felt to be of higher priority. Schori emphasized an
interesting point of view that by actively participating and
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contributing a specially trained Swedish battalion to
operate with the CSCE and UN in out of area (OOA) crisis
Sweden would be helping to prevent these organizations from
becoming nothing more than an operational "pax-Americana."
(Ref. 72]
Z. NORDIC / BALTIC SECURITY COOPERATION
In addition to the trend for closer political ties with
Europe, there is perhaps what may prove to be the counter
Swedish trend of encouraging incorporation of the Baltic
states into a regional forum. Ole Waever's "Nordic
Nostalgia: Northern Europe after the Cold War," illuminates
this Baltic Sea cooperation which supplants at the same time
as its adds to a movement toward a broader European
identity, particularly in Sweden [Ref. 73:p. 97].
Participation of Sweden, Denmark and Finland in Baltic
integration in conjunction with and/or distinct from overall
European integration would be an especially needed
stabilizing regional influence. As Robert S. Wood, Dean of
the Center for Naval Warfare at the Naval War College,
points out, "...the collapse of the Soviet East European
empire and finally the disintegration of the U.S.S.R.
itself, the issue of trans-European unity reemerges, but so
does virulent tribalism." [Ref. 74:p. 20) Including the
Baltic states into some type of broader security would serve
to enmesh, ".. .the Baltic states in regional and broader
security structures so as to make it extremely difficult for
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a resurgent power to rise from the ashes of the Soviet Union
and present a reinvigorated military or hegemonic
threat .... " [Ref. 40:p. 55] A consultative Baltic Council
has already been established with the goal of forming a
Baltic Custom Union to provide closer coordination between
the Baltic and Nordic Council and through the formation of a
Baltic-Black Sea Association, and possibly a Council of
Baltic Sea Countries. [Ref. 40:pp. 71-72] Lastly, it is
noteworthy in the context of the changing international
strategic regime, that security policy has been recently
broached for the first time by the Nordic Council, long a
taboo topic there. [Ref. 37:p. 95] Sweden has been
particularly active within the Nordic Council and the Nordic
Council of Ministers in assisting the building of the Baltic
Council as an institution [Ref. 22].
The Baltic states look to the Nordic states as their
link to "Greater Europe" and their conduit to eventual
economic integration to the continent without "cultural
domination" (particularly from Germany). The Nordic states
are attempting to cooperate through the Nordic Council to
channel and limit counterproductive economic competition
among themselves to assist the Baltics in the building of
viable economic and political infrastructures. Informal
contacts have often proved more important than the formal
ones. Swedish businessmen in the Baltic republics are seen
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as less threatening in the long term than the ever present
Germans. [Ref. 22]
The Baltic states would very much like a military
alliance with Sweden (or essentially anyone) but the Swede's
are reluctant to encourage such hope. As pointed out by a
Ambassador Rodney Kennedy-Minott:
Although the Swedes support and applaud the drive for
freedom among the peoples of Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, and Poland, they also fear that such
expressions of militant nationalism will cause turmoil
and invite Soviet retaliation. [Ref. 49:p. 38]
Nonetheless, the Swedes have donated several small coastal
patrol vessels to Latvia and are also building a modest AEW
system for all three states. Estonia is not viewed in as
serious of difficulty, and has been able to obtain more
substantial help from Finland, a geographically closer
neighbor. [Ref. 22]
But the Baltic security threat presently to Sweden is
primarily perceived in terms of the already developing
massive influx of refugees. In 1992 over 83,200 arrived via
Russia and the Baltic states, mostly from Bosnia and Kosovo
but also from the Islamic republics of the former Soviet
Union [Ref. 75:pp. A-I-10]. The summer of 1993 the rate of
arrivals averaged well over 1,000 a week. With this influx
comes the not always stated concern over the potential for
criminal elements to enter Swedish society. This refugee
problem is viewed as a crisis, particularly in lieu of a
very high unemployment rate (9%) and overall sluggish
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economy [Ref. 76]. This refugee "crisis" is helping foster
the domestic political consensus between the governing
Moderates and the Social Democrats allowing increased
defense expenditures [Ref. 5].
But there is also an awareness of the inadequacy of the
Swedish response to a previous refugee crisis during the
World War II era, particularly the forced and generally
unpublicized return of Estonians, many with ethnic Swedish
ties. Writes Ola Tunander for her contribution to the
Baltic Institute's The Baltic Sea Area: A Region in the
Making:
Moreover, thousands of Baltic and especially Estonian
refugees have made an imprint on Swedish perceptions of
the world. Swedish-Baltic ties may grow stronger even
stronger now, with the returning refugees who carry with
their Swedish links (business, family and friendship) back
home.
Tunander also writes, interestingly, that:
Today, close political, economic and personal ties between
Scandinavian and Baltic countries are to a great extent
supported in Moscow, possibly to balance increased German
influence. [Ref. 77:pp. 211-12]
This enhanced regional focus may result in a reduced
Swedish reliance on broader international forums, such as
the UN, to further policy goals. This is not a stated
Swedish objective, but there are enough indications to merit
the view that this may be the long term trend.
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V. BUDGETARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY
At a time when defense cuts are essentially an accepted
given for the near future on both sides of what was the
"Iron Curtain," the Swedish government is increasing defense
expenditures. Speaking to the Parliamentary Assembly of the
Western European Union (WEU) in Paris, on 4 June 1992,
Swedish Defense Minister, Anders Bjorck stated that:
... Sweden is one of the few European states which will
be increasing its defense expenditure over the next few
years. Yesterday Parliament decided the orientation of
Sweden's defense policy for the period 1992-1997. On
the one hand this decision means an increase in the
defense budget in real terms after two decades of
unchanged military expenditure, while on the other hand
it involves an investment in the modernization of
Sweden's defenses, with some reductions in volume terms
to permit an improvement in the quality of equipment.
[Ref. 23:pp. 3-4]
This may appear a perplexing development in what was
virtually the classic "case study" nonaligned Western
industrial state which emphasized the diplomacy of arms
control and CSBMs over military alliances. However, there
is long term continuity in the logic for such increased
expenditures.
A. COMPARATIVE REGIONAL TRENDS IN DEFENSE SPENDING
During the 1960s Sweden devoted a relatively high amount
of its it Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to defense spending,
4%, as compared to 2.9% for Norway and 2.7% for Denmark.
The subsequent decline in the 1980s to 3% parallels similar
declines in character and size to West Germany, The
Netherlands and Belgium. Interestingly, Sweden's per capita
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defense spending of $481 (1985), was considerably higher
than the NATO average [Ref. 78:p. 152]. The 1990 percentage
of Swedish Gross National Product (GNP) spent on defense was
2.7% [Ref. 79:p. 14].
The regional defense expenditures for 1992 are $6.19
billion for Sweden, $3.51 for Norway, $2.59 for Denmark,
$1.98 in Finland and $31.03 for Germany. A short term
comparison of these expenditures with corresponding 1991
figures reveals a one year growth of 5.63% for Sweden. 1.45%
for Norway, a -0.77% drop for Denmark, a dramatic -10%
decline for Finland, and a -3.93% decline in the German
Defense budget. [Ref. 80:pp. 39-83]
There are various strategic perceptions, most notably
the "sausage theory" discussed previously that could be used
to attempt to explain Swedish increased defense expenditures
in the 1990s. However, the significance of a causal
relationship between strategic change and recent increased
defense expenditure is not convincing. The "strategic
change" has not resulted in increases in such expenditure in
any other Northern European nation, including Sweden's
Nordic neighbors which also face the same regional threat
from the chaos in the East. Moreover, the renewed Swedish
interest in rebuilding her defense forces arose before the
Soviet breakup. Interviews FOA analysts, Swedish military
officers, the Assistant US Naval attache and members of the
Swedish Government all stress, with one exception, that the
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current impetus for increase in the defense budget has been
the long delayed need to modernize, particularly the Army
- not strategic change. Though minor expenditures on
specific equipment, particular for the interception of
refugees from the East, can be directly linked to regional
instability, the overall budget can not [Ref. 5].
B. DOMSTIC POLITICS
Factors particular to Sweden can best explain an
increase in defense appropriations --- namely an attempt to
redress decades of decline in defense spending. The Soviet
submarine intrusions into Swedish territorial/internal
waters have received extensive publicity in throughout the
eighties and provided the government with the initial
previously lacking domestic support to redress the steady
decline in relative defense appropriations. Writes
Ambassador Kennedy-Minott:
In 1987, after a long debate, the Swedes adopted a
defense budget amounting to a 1.7 percent increase
annually over the next five years. This marked the
first such increase in twenty years, but by 1989-1990
it was becoming apparent that this increase would not
be enough. [Ref. 49:p. 37]
The linkage between the submarine intrusions and the
defense budget has become a domestic political issue in
itself. The Social Democrats, which have held power for
most of the period since World War II have traditionally
been much less keen to support defense expenditures [Ref.
81]. In an interview in June 1993 Pierre Schori maintained
that the submarine incursions were not a political issue for
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the his opposition Social Democrats, but only for the
government, who inflate the issue of the "budget boats" for
their own political agenda. He also continued to expressed
doubt that these intrusions have even occurred [Ref. 13].
The submarine issue has been a reoccurring domestic
political issue for over ten years, "Politically, it has
brought out bipolarity between Conservatives, who want to
spend more on defense, and the Social Democrats, who want to
spend less." [Ref. 53:p. 200] (Both US and Swedish naval
officers familiar with this issue maintain that unclassified
sources indicate continued penetration of Swedish
territorial/internal waters by Russian submarines and/or
submersibles. In fact after being given acoustic tapes by a
Swedish delegation in February 1993 Russian President
Yeltsin confirmed that his experts concluded that the
incursions were intrusions into Swedish territorial/internal
waters by underwater vehicles --- but did not admit that
they were Russian [Ref. 5]. Additionally, the first
official Submarine Defense Commission as far back as 1983
clearly identifies Warsaw Pact vessels as the transgressors
[Ref. 29:p. 80]).
Schori further elaborated that in his view the Supreme
Commander, Bengt Gustafsson, has had great difficulty in
admitting that there is no military threat to Sweden today,
though "he would like to say differently for budgetary
reasons." Despite this long term trend of bipolarity on the
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submarine issue and defense allocations the Bocial Democrats
aup-orted the 1992-1997 defense plan and its increase in
defonse funding. The consensus has since broken down and
there have been two modest downward revisions in defense
appropriations but this is primarilly due to differences
over overall economic policy rather than strategic planning.
[Ref. 12] [Ref. 13]
C. ECONOMIC ASPZCTS OF STRATIGIC ENV'ROM•UT
Arising from both domestic and international critics,
there have been unflattering claims over the years, that
Sweden has benefitted from "de facto" NATO protection and
the US nuclear guarantee to the alliance. This has been a
politically sensitive issue in Sweden. An economic study by
James C. Murdoch and Todd Sandler, utilizing a utility-
maximizing model to estimate a demand curve for estimating
military expenditure, produced some results which were
perhaps not intuitive. An assumption of their model is that
nations "consider all possible deterrence decisions of the
other nations that it views as allies when choosing its own
level of military activity." [Ref. 78:p. 156]
Considerable research supports the contention,
particularly when examining NATO, that the smaller allies
gained a disproportionate share of their security from the
defense expenditures of their larger partners, particularly
in terms of the US nuclear "guarantee." During the 1950s,
when NATO conventional forces were relatively weak, nuclear
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deterrence was emphasized at the expense of conventional
capability. Murdoch and Sandler contend that as NATO
strategy shifted to "flexible response" at the end of the
1960s, and Northern Flank conventional forces were gradually
strengthened, Sweden's security posture was enhanced even
thouvh it was not a member of the alliance:
Clearly, strong conventional forces in Norway, Denmark
and West Germany could provide defense spill overs to
Sweden. Under MAD, conventional spill overs were less
significant for the neutral countries, like
Sweden.. .Neighboring NATO nations, such as Norway, have
increased their conventional armaments since the early
1970s and this increase can directly protect Swedish
sovereignty. [Ref. 78:p. 158]
After testing their model, Murdoch and Sandler conclude
that, Sweden, rather than free-riding on NATO defense
spending in aggregate, appear rather to have benefitted more
directly from defense spending by its Norwegian neighbor:
... prior to 1973 Sweden was self-reliant for its military
expenditure. During the flexible response era (a NATO
strategy) after 1973, Sweden began to rely, to some
extent, on its NATO neighbor Norway. [Ref. 78:p. 170]
The main draw on Swedish fiscal resources, particularly
from the early 1970s, was the dramatic rise in public sector
spending. Increased revenues were applied to this service
sector, and defense spending declined in relation to total
expenditure from 3.6% of GDP in 1970 to 3.0% in 1985;
Central Government Expenditure (CGE) decline was even
sharper. This decrease occurred during a period of
significantly rising Cold War tension, and an increase in
Soviet global and regional military capability, as well as
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outright Soviet intimidation [Ref. 78:p. 164]. Therefore,
"Sweden, as well as the NATO allies may put more weight on
internal budgetary considerations when deciding its military
expenditures (i.e., external threat may be of secondary
importance)." [Ref. 78:p. 165]
The economic effects on defense spending of a breakup of
NATO on Sweden is not predicted by Murdoch and Sandler to be
dramatic, particularly if Sweden joined a Nordic Defense
Pact with Norway and Denmark, "Since Swedish free-riding is
with respect with Norway and not NATO or the US per so,
Swedish defense expenditure should not be significantly
affected by a breakup in NATO." [Ref. 78:p. 170]
Additionally, it should be stressed that "Sweden's free-
riding on Norway is very limited in scope... [but] ... this
limited free-riding is likely to continue if a Nordic
Defense Pact is formed." [Ref. 78:p. 170] If valid, Murdoch
and Sandler's model would partially explain the need for
Sweden to bolster its own defense expenditures to compensate
for reduction in Norwegian efforts, but this does not appear
to be strong enough to constitute the significant factor.
Little correlation, positive or negative, was discernable
between Swedish and Danish defense expenditure, or for that
matter, Soviet.
As a counter argument, the Swedes can and do argue that
NATO enjoys significant benefit by Swedish defense efforts,
particularly from her Air Force, which in size and quality
70
is comparable to Germany's. This force in essence, guards
Norway's eastern border as well as Sweden. Richard
Bitzinger, in his 1991 RAND study, Facing the Future: The
Swedish Air Force, 1990-2005, supports this view:
... Swedish defense efforts have long benefitted NATO
security in the Nordic region. Sweden's ability to
mount a considerable defense effort, particularly an
extended defense over its national airspace and much of
the Baltic Sea, constitutes a substantial shield
protecting NATO's northern flank. Therefore, the
maintenance of a strong Swedish defense has long been
in the interests of the Atlantic alliance...
... In the absence of a large and sophisticated
Swedish defense capability, NATO would be forced (1) to
devote many more resources than it presently does to
the defense of its northern flank and (2) to pressure
Denmark and Norway into expanding their defense efforts.
(Ref. 37:pp. v, 1]
D. TECEOLOGICAL UPGRADZS AND DEFENSZE XPENDITURE
The second "driver" for reversing decades of relative
defense reductions is focused on the technological
revolution in warfighting. Such trends demand that Sweden
remain at the cutting edge of key areas of defense
technology. Reliance on arms imports will not be a Swedish
option. States Defense Minister Bjorck, "...Sweden will
safeguard the survival of our defense industry, and its long
term development capability." (Ref. 58:p. 10] Thus reliance
on indigenous arms production, particularly in key high
technology areas will remain a precept of Swedish security
policy, despite the seemingly global phenomena of the
logarithmic rise in platform cost in ratio to platform
numbers. For this reason, alternatives such as purchasing
US F-18s or F-16s, both considered in 1982, which might
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produce considerable savings rather than the cost plagued
indigenous Gripen 39 program, are not acceptable. Bjorck
clearly states the Gripen remains a priority: "Investment in
the JAS 39 Gripen combat aircraft is of particular
importance... there is no alternative to an independent
Swedish defense system." [Ref. 58:p. 4] Much political and
monetary captial has already been sunken into the indigneous
effort. The basic logic of this continued approach was
reiterated by the PM in his introduction to the 1992 Defense
Bill: "As regards the purchase of military equipment for
the Swedish defense forces, we should avoid dependence on
other countries which might exert pressure in an acute
crisis." [Ref. 56:p. 4]
Z. N]PZD.N]LTS TO ZNClZABZD DZFKNSE ZIXP]NDTUER
Murdoch and Sandler contend that the most significant
variable to examine for a reflection on long term Swedish
defense budgeting is not its GDP but its CGE. The
percentage of CGE spend on defense has seen dramatic decline
as a result of the corresponding rise in domestic welfare
and transfer payments, "In 1960, 20.4 percent of Swedish CGE
was allocated to defense; in 1985, only 6.4 percent went to
defense." [Ref. 78:p. 153] Perhaps, a parallel can be drawn
between the current US budgetary constraints and the Swedish
experience, ". .. empirical evidence suggests that the
military sector is shouldering most of the burden of Swedish
drive to balance the budget in the 1980s." [Ref. 78:p. 166]
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Though the Swedish government's current intention is
clearly to sustain, even increase the percentage of CGE
allocated to defense to meet long term security objectives,
there is likely to be a sharp political threshold to these
increases. The Swedish economy shrank a further 3.6% in the
final quarter of 1992, the worst since the Official Bureau
of Statistics changed their calculations in 1980, and
foreshadowed a third straight year of recession [Ref. 83:p.
I11.
F. PROPORTIONALITY OF DEFEN-.E SPENDING
Sweden proportioned its funds within its defense
branches in 1981 with 33.4% going to land forces; 34.7% for
air forces, 14.2% for naval forces, 13.1% for central
support and 0.6% for UN peacekeeping troops [Ref. 78:p.
1541. After the October 1981 "Whiskey on the Rocks"
incident and the resultant massive publicity of the
continued Soviet submarine intrusions into Sweden's
territorial/internal waters, the Navy was allotted
supplemental funds in 1983, amounting to $120 million
specifically for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) [Ref. 49:p.
27]. It is therefore apparent that domestic politics can
significantly impact not only the size of defense spending,
but how it is proportioned as well.
Some comparisons between Sweden and other Nordic nations
are worth noting. For example, both Sweden and Finland
spent in 1987 about $300 million on equipment for their
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armies, which have about an equal mobilized strength, but
the Swedish ".. .Navy and especially the Air Force spent much
more than their Finnish counterparts." [Ref. 79:pp. 14-15]
Sweden was about 80% self sufficient in material, about
twice Finland's rate. This compares well with both France
and Britain which were 70 to 80% self sufficient in 1987
[Ref. 79:p. 15].
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VI. SWEDISH DZFENSZ INDUSTRY
A. STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL BASE
An emphasis on domestic arms production is not a new
Swedish objective; it has nurtured a strong military
industrial base for many years. Sweden is particularly
unique in that, though a relatively small nation, it has
been able to maintain competitive in key areas. This owes
much to focused planning. Ingemar Dorfer contends in his
book on the Viggen program, System 37 Viggen, that Sweden
has long adapted the second of three scientific strategies
for maintaining its industrial base. Sweden does not
attempt to compete across the board, nor does it extensively
pursue a policy of acquiring foreign licenses to compensate
for a lack of basic research. Rather Sweden's industrial
policy has traditionally been designed to conduct original
research and development in specific areas to both bolster
Sweden's high technology exports, on which it is heavily
dependent, and to support a security policy stressing
minimal external dependence on foreign arms. Writes Dr.
Inegmar Dorfer:
Instead of following in the footsteps of the superpowers
in order to keep up with them on a broad front of basic
research and technology, Sweden has concentrated her R & D
in those fields of science and technology considered
important for the future development of industrial
strength. [Ref. 84:p. 15]
Dorfer elaborates further in a 1991 paper for the
Swedish Defense Research Institute (FOA):
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Since the power blocs have weapons systems directed
against each other none of them are optimized against
the Swedish defense profile. At the same time the
nation needs competence to follow the technological
development of the great powers .... [Ref. 84:p. 12]
Relying on her Air Force for not only air defense but a
"periphery defense" strategy to defeat the perceived major
threat to Sweden during the 1960s, an amphibious invasion
from the Soviet Union in conjunction within a larger
European War, great effort was placed on maintaining a
robust domestic aerospace industry [Ref. 28:p. 165]. To
visualize the economic impact of this focus, it is useful to
point out that for many years during the 1960s the Viggen
interceptor/attack aircraft project "alone consumed 10% of
all Swedish R & D funds, or comparatively as much as the
Apollo project in the United States." [Ref. 84 :p. 15]
B. COOPERATION WITH FOREIGN FIRMS: HISTORICAL LOOK
As early as 1936 the Swedish Parliament had determined,
"...that an indigenous aircraft industry was to be a key
element in the Swedish defense effort...." [Ref. 79:p. 3]
But such strong emphasis on the domestic aerospace industry
does not mean there has not been a history of cooperation
with foreign firms. Britain was Sweden's chief partner
after world War II, to be eventually superseded by the US.
[Ref. 79:p. 4]
Reliance on support from Britain in the 1950s was
largely the result of Sweden's decision in 1949 to remain
outside NATO "and for nine years Sweden was denied advanced
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American military technology." [Ref. 79:p. 5] This ban was
lifted in 1958 and permitted extensive cooperation with the
US, which allowed the eventual incorporation of the US Pratt
& Whitney JT8D-22 into the Viggen program, as well as the
Sidewinder air intercept missile (AIM)-9, and considerable
avionics. The Improved HAWK surface to air missile (SAM),
Hellfire anti-ship missile (ASM), Redeye SAM, TOW anti-tank
missile (ATM), Hughes 300B and Bell 204, 206 helicopters
were all US systems exported to Sweden. As Ingemar Dorfer
points out:
System 37 Viggen, the symbol of Swedish independence is
20% foreign, 14% American and 6% European .... The Viggen
successor JAS 39 Gripen (currently in the test and
development phase) is 40% foreign - 20% American and 20%
European.. .The Navy has been less dependent.. .but was
helped with crucial ASW technology during the 1980s
when submarine intrusions into Swedish waters were
common... The Army, (is) traditionally the most
insular .... [Ref. 79:pp. 6-7]
However, there is sound historical precedents for Sweden
to attempt to be as self sufficient as possible,
particularly when its major strategic objective was to
remain outside of any security alliance to allow for a
policy of neutrality in war. This logic appears to have
weakened as the Swedish need to politically distance itself
from the super powers, both internationally and
domestically, has diminished. Nevertheless, Swedish policy
makers have clearly reiterated that domestic production of
arms remains a pillar of their strategy. Perhaps the answer
to this riddle lies in the strength of the impression of
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historical experience upon Swedish policy makers. Details
Dorfer:
A crucial step in the formation of weapons development
philosophy had been taken in the first weeks of World
War II.. .SAAB urged the (Industrial) Commission not to
base its planning on dumped price foreign aircraft.
Over the next few years SAAB was proven right. France
did not deliver its Brequt.. .Germany canceled it
contract for Donier 213. [Ref. 84:p. 66)
During its period of reliance on British cooperation in
the 1950s relations were also very amicable. This was not
always the case with Swedish - US relations. In response to
Prime Minister Palme's statements condemning the US bombings
of Hanoi, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger attempted to
stop the export of spare parts for the Viggen, but was
overruled by DoD and President Nixon [Ref. 79:p. 8].
Subsequently, "In 1975 Washington in fact vetoed Viggen
exports to the NATO members Norway, Denmark, The Netherlands
and Belgium and in 1978 the Carter Administration vetoed
Viggen exports to India." [Ref. 79:p. 8] Writes Ambassador
Rodney-Kennedy Minott:
Another negative factor that strained relations was
the apparent capriciousness in application of U.S. export
control rules and regulations. That problem, combined
with the time-consuming process of obtaining clearances
and approvals from a myriad of U.S. government agencies,
further frustrated the Swedes. To make it worse, those
Swedes most affected were the industrial and military
leaders who were the most pro-U.S.... [Ref. 49:p. 18]
Paradoxically, as American and Swedish relations have
improved, the likelihood of Sweden's reliance on American
systems, in the long term, appears to have diminished and
closer cooperation with European industry more likely. But
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this should be not overstated. The Swedes will still be
dependent on US technological cooperation in key areas.
Incorporation of the still developing US advanced medium-
range air-to-air missile (AMRAAM) AIM for the Gripen is
under consideration (as is a a joint French-Swedish system).
But whether imports are US or European in origin, Sweden is
becoming more dependent on the West, particularly in
avionics and air-to-air missiles (AAM) as Richard Bitzinger
points out:
... it is a little known fact that the SwAF's (Swedish
Air Force's) AIM-9L Sidewinders.. .must be serviced
abroad.. .Not only does this raise Swedish reliance on
the West, but also a number of Swedish air-to-air
missiles may be outside the country at any one
time.... [Ref. 48:p. 30]
1. Current Arms Imports and Foreign Licenses
Sweden is reported in the SIPRI Yearbook 1992 as the
recipient in the period 1987-91 of $315 million in
conventional arms from abroad or produced under foreign
license. Of this total, $130 million was US, $91 million
French, $57 million British, $35 million German and $2
million other. [Ref. 85:p. 314]
C. CURRENT PROJECTS
1. Aerospace Industry
The major project for the Air Force, and the major
current project for Swedish defense industries as a whole is
the JAS 39 Gripen. The airframe is produced by Saab-Scania.
It will utilize a Volvo and GE 440-400 jet engine. The
radar, central computer, heads up display (HUD) are produced
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domestically by Ericsson. Honeywell (US) is producing the
Inertial Navigation System (INS) and the fly by wire is a
Swedish Lear Astronics product. The Gripen has been plagued
by cost overruns, is at least two years behind schedule, and
had its first prototype crash in 1989. Writes Dorfer:
A major problem with the software provided by Lear
Astronatics for the fly by wire system caused the crash.
Unlike the French Raphael and the British-German-Italian
EFA JAS is based on hard tooling, leaving little
flexibility for correction.. .Whereas the Norwegian Air
Force can buy its latest F-16 for a fly away price of $17
million... the JAS unit price will be $33 million including
R & D, i.e., twice that of the F-16. [Ref. 79:p. 10]
The first Gripen was delivered to the Swedish Air Force in
June 1993. The Poles, among others, have expressed an
interest in acquiring the Gripen which is the worlds only
light-weight fighter to combine the interceptor, attack and
reconnaissance role into one system (Ref. 86:p. 321. It
will be currently operational with the US Aim-7 Sparrow and
AIM-9 Sidewinder for the air intercept role, and the Bofors
RBS-70 for maritime attack. [Ref. 87:p. 107]
The Swedish aircraft industry overall had an
overall net worth of approximately $14 billion in 1989, $6.5
for SAAB, $3.5 for Volvo Flymotor and an avionics industry
worth $4 billion. For a perspective, Boeing was worth $160
billion in 1989. [Ref. 79:pp. 9-101
2. Other Industries
In addition to its core aerospace industry, Sweden
is also a technological leader in diesel submarine
technology and shallow water ASW and will be an attractive
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partner in future European projects. Expertise in building
short, small tonnage surface combatant hulls for limited
endurance missions in the Baltic should position Sweden well
for sales to other littoral states with a need for a patrol
craft in an extensive archipelago [Ref. 88:p. 21] "The
shipbuilding industry - and especially the production of
submarines - has adapted a successful export policy since
the late 1980s." [Ref. 8 9:p. 147] Cooperation between
Kockums of Sweden and the Australian Submarine Corporation
(ASC) is already underway for an advanced diesel submarine
which includes both integrated R&D and development. Writes
Bjorn Hagelin of the Department of Peace and Conflict
Research at Uppsala, Sweden:
The submarine project is an extraordinary venture, one
of the biggest military projects ever undertaken in
Australia and the first foreign sale of Swedish
submarines. The contract encompasses the entire chain of
activities from development and design to production
planning, manufacture, sea trials, spare parts supply and
training. The total cost is.. .more than half Sweden's
annual military expenditure. [Ref. 90:p. 31
Despite the Australian majority share in the overall
program management, and assemblage there, US companies are
also heavily involved. Rockwell Collins (US) is a major
participant in the Consortium. The ASC itself includes
Wormald International Australia (US) and CBI Constructors
(US). The combat systems development and production will
include heavy involvement by Rockwell International and
Singer Librascope Division of the United States. Other
partiripants include Rockwell Electronics of the United
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States and Bath Iron works of the United States as
consultants (these companies are not necessarily US owned)
[Ref. 88:pp. 90-911. The point here, is that this very
significant bilateral Swedish-Australian arms project is
inseparable from an increasingly integrated global arms
production infrastructure.
D. * FUTURN TRENDS
1. Continuation of High Technology Niphasis
The Gulf War was not a "lesson" limited to Russian
military thinkers. The Swedes took particular notice of the
decisiveness of the edge in quality of Coalition air power.
This served to reinforce Swedish efforts to continue with
the JAS 39 Gripen combat aircraft program, a program firmly
rooted in Swedish concerns to maintain indigenous
technological capability. [Ref. 84:p. 10] However, Ingemar
Dorfer predicts but also qualifies that:
After fifty years of developing and producing Swedish
combat aircraft JAS Gripen is certainly the last and
most expensive jet fighter. Much of the missiles and
avionics are American and British and the foreign share
does increase. Uniquely Swedish is however the base
and C31 system, the maintenance and logistics and the
integration with the civilian infrastructure. Foreign
technology has been mated with clever national doctrine
in a profitable manner. [Ref. 79:p. 25]
2. Integration with Europe
There are significant political trends, in addition
to technological ones, that are highlighted by the Prime
Minister, Defense Minister and others, foreshadowing
increased cooperation between Sweden and Europe,
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particularly in light of the pending integration into the
EC. In his introduction to his Defense Bill, the Prime
Minister clearly acknowledges this, while also stressing the
security need to retain Swedish indigenous capability:
An independent supply capability in time of war,
and in crises which involve the threat of war, is still
required. On the other hand, as a result of Sweden's
impending membership of the European Community,
independent supply req-,irements for other types of
crisis will be lower than the past. [Ref. 56:p. 4]
But independence from the European defense industry is no
longer a security objective however, stated Prime Minister
Bildt, "Swedish membership of the EC will mean that we can
assume that the risk of measures of this type [ecomomic
external pressure on security foreign policy maters]
directed against Sweden by other members of the EC will be
totally eliminated ..... " [Ref. 56:p. 47]
The economic aspects of Sweden's integration into
the EC are likely to be closely shadowed by direct affects
on its arms export policy, and future security partners,
particularly the effect of cooperative production and co-
development programs. Ian Anthony, in his book for the
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),
elaborates the systemic consequences of co-development:
Co-development requires a participating country to accept
a degree of loss of national control over the procurement
process, and therefore presupposes a close political
relationship between participants .... co-development also
requires consultation and joint planning by participants
from the outset. [Ref. 88:p. 68]
... co-development is of enormous potential significance
for the arms trade. In future, systems developed and
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produced jointly could replace systems previously traded,
in particular between members of the major alliances. If
this were to happen it could have profound implications
both for relationships between European countries and for
the relations of those countries with the United States
and Canada. [Ref. 88:p. 16]
Anthony further highlights the potential for an EC
dominated arms export regime, perhaps the already formed
Independent European Program Group (IEPG), drawn from the
European members of NATO, to alter previously independent
and sovereign decisions on arms transfers and exports of
member nations. This has obvious policy implications for
Sweden when it becomes a full EC member. Co-development
could strain continued Swedish attempts to distance itself
from military alliances and could also contribute to
economic (arms export competition) undercurrents within NATO
which might weaken links across the Atlantic. This should
not be overstated, however, as previous discussion on strong
Swedish desires to maintain and even strengthen Atlantic
links for Swedish security goals have already addressed.
As Anthony highlights:
The implications are particularly important for very large
programs, where the cost of research, design,
development and production is simply beyond the budgetary
possibilities of a single country other than one or the
other superpower. If the forum for organizing procurement
of this kind was to be the IEPG within NATO, it would
further contribute to the perception of a growing
polarization between Europe and the United States as
separate decision making centers within the alliance. If
the organizational setting for greater collaboration was
to be outside the alliance, it would contribute to the
perception in the United States and elsewhere that growing
political unity in Western Europe was creating a powerful
economic bloc. [Ref. 88:pp. 16-17]
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The IEPG will be transferring control of the
European-Co-Operation for the Long Term in Defense (EUCLID),
a NATO organization founded in 1976 to coordinate European
NATO defense research and to establish standards of
commonality in arms production, to the Western European
Union (WEU) organ, the European Defense Industry Group
(EDIG). By transferring control of the organization to the
WEU American influence is expected to be reduced. An
eventual savings of 20% is expected in the current over
capacity European defense industry with the assistance of
EUCLIDs long term coordination and planning. Euclid is free
of parliamentary control and conducts research and
development in close cooperation with industry and academia.
The Bildt government is reportedly in contact with the IEPG
but apparently have not formalized cooperation. The Social
Democrats are reportedly positive towards the IEPG as well.
Swedish participation in joint military research within the
WEU structure will likely impact Sweden's overall policy
towards the security organization. [Ref. 91]
Though Sweden domestic sufficiency in arms
production has been very high, it is "...probably too high
to be economic." [Ref. 79:p. 26] Sweden will have to
"...export more or integrate more with the Western industry
to survive." [Ref. 79:p. 26] Interestingly, Sweden ranks
first in the world in the measure of offset obligations as a
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percentage of sales (173%) By comparison, the US percentage
averages around 50%, and the UK 105%. [Ref. 92:p. 176)
Ingemar Dorfer outlines the impact of recent global
geopolitical change and how it will impact Swedish strategy
in its "pillar concept" of self sufficiency. Significantly,
he concludes by identifying that Sweden's long stated
precepts of neutrality in war are less constraining on
industry and her international affairs in peacetime, in the
post Cold War environment, allowing for a lessening of self
sufficiency. Fortunately for Sweden, this geopolitical
change has occurred coincident in time with the economic
impracticality of maintaining a rigidly self sufficient
industrial base:
In the paradigm shift under way in Swedish politics and
society arms exports will not remain the tabu topic it
has been in the past. If Sweden is to enter the
Economic Community and collaborate with the European
armaments industry also the arms export rules will
change. Unlike Swedish industry in general the defense
industry is not used to collaborate in Europe.
Fortunately the major Swedish armaments corporations
are half in and half out of the defense business. The
choices outlined by Andrew Moravesik - collaboration,
competing consortia and managed trade - are relevant
also to Sweden. In an integrated economy Sweden's
weapons dependence will be more obvious than it has
been in the postwar period but nor will it clash
with a proclaimed policy of neutrality and independence
as it has in the past. [Ref. 79:pp. 26-27]
The slump in the world arms market, declining post-
Cold War defense budgets and political pressures are
creating an environment of consolidation, as well as both
horizontal and vertical integration in arms production. The
Swedish arms industry will likely become even more effected
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by this general European trend after EC membership. But
these industrial trends are a global rather than a
continental phenomena. In an attempt at divesture to
provide a financial foundation broader than a purely defense
base, Saab-Scania recently was infused with investment from
General Motors [Ref. 93:p. 102]. The transaction included
collaboration in defense related projects. Bofors has
recently signed an agreement with Raufoss of Norway which
will lead to a narrowing of core areas of production:
Raufoss will produce shells for both companies and Bofors
the gunpowder [Ref. 941.
A report from the Svenska Dagbladet indicated that
Mica of France is the likely producer of the semi-active
air-to-air missile (AAM) for the Gripen. The contract could
be worth $1 billion (US). Ericsson is reported to have
already been contracted to develop the fire control radar
for the semi-active missile. Though the complete agreement
is apparently not concluded, and other missiles are still
under consideration (the US AMRAAM), if Sweden's Ericsson
Electronics can successfully develop the radar, considerable
profit and employment will remain within Sweden. The
Swedish-French agreement is not specifically concerned with
the missile project but focuses on joint production and
further integration of Sweden into the European defense
industry. A decision on the missile is scheduled for late
1994. Though traditionally dependent on the US for their
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air-intercept-missiles (AIMs) the US is reported to have
refused export rights for the AMRAAM as part of the JAS-37
Gripen system. This allegedly is reported in the article as
having influenced the Finns decision to purchase the US F/A-
18 Hornet rather than the Swedish Gripen. In another joint
Swedish-European defense industry possibility, reported in
Dagens Industri, a linkage of British Aerospace's marketing
organization to help SAAB Military Aircraft export the
Gripen is conjectured. [Ref. 94]
Perhaps not so obvious potential is closer Swedish-
Japanese cooperation in defense industries, particularly
Aerospace. Stated Defense Minister Bjorck in his 23
November 1992 speech in Tokyo:
We are very much impressed with Japanese high-technology
and the remarkable degree of competence that Japan has
built up in a wide range of industries. Many of these
industries - particularly the electronics industry - are
of vital importance to modern defense technology.
Today, cooperation between Japan and Sweden in the
defense industry sector is relatively limited. I trust
that, in the future this cooperation will increase in
different fields of mutual interest. [Ref. 8:pp. 10-11]
Kockums has been working with Mitsubishi since 1990
to develop a 600kW version of the Stirling air independent
propulsion (AIP) power plant. The Harushio class submarine
currently under construction at the Mitsubishi and Kawasaki
shipyard in Kobe is generally viewed as the likely platform.
[Ref. 95:p. 518]
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Z. EXPORTS AND ARMS TRANSFER RGUL•ATORY POLICY
1. Export Overview
Sweden is the largest arms exporter per capita in
the world, according to Ron Matthews of the School of
Defense Management, Cranfield Institute of Technology, and
is "has firms selling arms to some forty countries." [Ref.
96:p. 42] But it is worth noting that Swedish exports in
aggregate, particularly high technology industrial goods,
are a very high percentage of the Swedish economy. Seen in
this light, Ingemar Dorfer points out that, "A weapons
export of $1 billion is not much in a nation that exports
$50 billion a year, 2%." [Ref. 79:p. 23] According to the
SIPRI Yearbook 1992, in 1990 Sweden had 1.0% of the worlds
arm market, a drop from 1.4% in 1989, for a total value of
1.9$ billion [Ref. 85:p. 363]. The arms industry is clearly
significant to the overall economy:
... Sweden has maintained a broad arms industrial base
employing around 33,000 people and representing 10% of the
engineering industry. The weapon and defense electronic
industries have depended on exports for around 50% of
their sales, while aircraft and shipbuilding have been
more dependent on sales to the Swedish armed forces.
[Ref. 89:p. 147]
The Swedish drive for arms export markets is primarily
driven by overall domestic economic difficulties.
Currently, senior military officers are very actively
involved in promoting Swedish defense products abroad [Ref.
5] But the Minister of Foreign Trade, Anita Gradin, expects
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a future overall decrease in Swedish arms exports [Ref.
89:p. 146].
2. The Zxport Scandals
The 1980s were not good years in public relations
for Swedish arms manufacturers. Writes Ambassador Rodney-
Kennedy Minott, The ethnically sensitive Swedes received the
most negative publicity concerning arms export scandals that
have severely compromised Sweden's world position and self-
image as a major advocate of arms control, pristine of
character and pure of motivation in a fashion not truly
applicable to other nations." [Ref. 12:p. 35] Bofors and
FFV have been implicated in arms smuggling scandals dating
to the 1960s. Fifty fast patrol boats were sold to Iran by
Boghammers Marin during the ongoing Iran-Iraq war. A Bofors
subsidiary, Nobel Industries, also provided Iran with
surface to air missiles. Nobel Kemi has also been accused
of selling ammunition to Iran and Syria. Britain has been a
transient point for the export of Carl Gustav light anti-
tank missiles. Italy and Yugoslavia were transhipment
points for Nobel Kemi ammunition sales to the Middle East.
Malmo was accused of smuggling explosives to Iran through a
European transhipment network. [Ref. 96:p. 42] [Ref. 89:p.
148] Nobel built a chemical factory in Iran to ostensibly
"...assist in eradicating an endemic grasshopper problem."
[Ref. 89:p. 148] Writes Ron Mathews:
Though Sweden is the only European country not in the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to accept the
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MTCR guidelines to stop missile proliferation in the
developing world, Bofors appears to have been involved in
assisting Iraq, Argentina, and Egypt in the development of
the Condor II ballistic missile project. Also, Bofors has
been accused of selling hundreds of RBS-70 missiles to
Bahrain, Dubai and Thailand via Singapore. (Ref. 96:p.
42]
In part, these sales result from ambiguous laws. In the
spring of 1989, Sweden introduced legislation to close
loopholes in its arms-exports controls (Ref. 96:p. 43].
3. Export Policy
A "Citizens Commission" was authorized by the
Government to investigate the continuing export scandals.
Their report in May 1988 recommended significant regulatory
revision and enforcement. Subsequent to their findings
three major pieces of legislation were enacted on July 1,
1988. Under Swedish law war material can not be exported
unless prior permission has been given by the Government,
and, "The same restriction also applies to other activities
related to arms exports such as the lease and transfer of
rights of manufacture, co-production agreements and
marketing of military equipment abroad." [Ref. 89:p. 149]
Official policy statements stress that Sweden, "should
continue to implement a restrictive export policy regarding
the choice of recipient countries." [Ref. 89:p. 154)
"Sweden faces the dilemma of wanting to keep arms exports to
a minimum and yet needing to export to maintain the maximum
possible degree of self sufficiency in arms production."
[Ref. 89:p. 154]
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4. Direct Impact of ZC Membership
Swedish export policy will be directly affected by
the EC regulatory regime as a consequence of full
membership, however:
According to Article 223 of the Treaty of Rome, the EC
should not become involved in national security policies
but should deal with industry purely on industrial-
economic terms. This article was not deleted from the
Treaty in the December 1991 Maastricht EC meeting, despite
the long debates on a possible revision of the Treaty.
[Ref. 85:p. 369]
Though there has been some progress in forming a common EC
policy on nuclear, chemical and biological transfers,
Traditionally, it has not been possible to bring
conventional arms exports under EC authority." [Ref. 97:p.
10]
Another eventual consequence of EC membership may
be financial support for the Swedish arms industry. There
is strong support in the European Parliament for such an EC
support program but there is resistance in the EC Council
and the current majority in the EC Commission [Ref. 85:p.
369]
F. FUTURE ECONOMIC PROJECTION AND RESEARCH FOCUS
Sweden's continuation of its historical reliance on
indigenous research, development and production of key high
technology weaponry for its defense, and the associated
rising costs of this approach, is a significant demand on
fiscal resources. The need to remain competitive in the
global arms export market in order to support indigenous
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production lines for the relatively very small needs of its
own defense forces could pose significantly increasing
difficulties. The coming decade is likely to see more
fierce competition. Alice M. Rivlin's introduction to The
Swedish Economy, a Brookings Institution publication,
identifies the key macroeconomic vulnerability Sweden must
overcome:
... an American is struck by how small the Swedish economy
is compared with the economies of the United States or the
larger economies of Western Europe. In 1985 Sweden's
gross domestic product was 3% of U.S. GDP, 16 percent of
Germany's ....
Sweden is an open economy, highly dependent on
foreign trade and vulnerable to outside shocks. In
1985 exports accounted for 32% of GDP .... This dependence
on foreign trade means that firms in Swedish export
industries have to set their prices to stay competitive in
world markets.. .the recent integration of its capital
markets with those of the rest of the world has increased
Swedish vulnerability to outside events. [Ref. 98:p. 3]
The National Defense Research Establishment (FOA)
has focused research into certain technologies: ASW;
electronic warfare; anti-tank weapons; air defense; and C31.
Future priorities will be to target acquisition for anti-
shipping weapons, SAM improvements, fortification, stealth
technique, precision guided munitions, robust command
systems, sensors, communications security, data processing,
Electronic Countermeasures (ECM), multistatic radar, high
energy lasers, high power microwaves, man - machine
relations and Anti Biological and Chemical (ABC) weapons
protection [Ref. 79:p. 25].
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Additionally, Sweden's Business and Technology
Development Board has established Nutek as an
interdisciplinary consortia to conduct research in new
materials with a long term focus that may have dual uses.
The group has close ties with domestic and international
industry. A review by professors from the US and Europe was
very favorable, commended the planning and conduct of the
research and noted a particular strength in biomaterial
research. Their are four major areas of focus: "thin films
and microstructure, material with unique properties, theory
and simulation, and surfaces and how they interact." [Ref.
99:p. 17] The consortia is largely integrated with
international industry and is involved in EC research
programs.
Sweden is also active in space research. The
Swedish Space Corporation's third satellite, Freja, was
launched by the Chinese March 2 rocket booster in 1992. The
Freja is built to study the aurora borealis, and includes
participation from Germany, Canada and the US. [Ref. 1001
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VII. MODURNIZATION OF ARMU FORCES
A. ARMY AND AIR FORCE MISSION CHANGES
Sweden's 1992-97 Defense Bill is a significant attempt
to modernize their forces and a change in assigned tasks.
Planning will now focus on tactical surprise. The
traditional military force structure was designed to have
the capability to provide a robust enough defense to deter a
major invasion by an aggressor in conjunction with its war
on the Central front by making such an attack unreasonably
costly. Adequate time for time for mobilization of a
700,000 man reserve force was a planning assumption. The
Defense Minister Bjorck has stated that a changed threat now
requires mechanized land forces capable of mobilizing much
quicker than under the previous planning assumption (10
days) [Ref. 101]. The Swedish Axmy still has virtually no
standing operational combat formations. Rather it has a
corps of professional officers and reserve officers that for
decades have served a primarily training function. And
numbers are going down dramatically. The current planning
goal is to have 16 Army brigades by 1994 (down from 29 in
1987). The purchase of 200 Leopard II main battle tanks
(MBTs) from Germany is part of the modernization effort, but
at the expense in the number of regiments. The Social
Democrats have proposed further reductions (down to 12
brigades). Special emphasis will be placed on developing
night-combat capability, anti-tank and anti-aircraft
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capability, personal protection of soldiers and speed and
mobility. [Ref. 102] [Ref. 103]
States the Norwegian edition of the IISS Military
Balance in Northern Europe 1992-93:
The parliamentary decision in 1992 ... implies
considerable changes in the defense tasks.. .A strategic
surprise attack remains the focus for defense planning.
A major attack across the Baltic is primarily to be
countered by denying the attacker getting a firm grip on
the ground. In case of an overland attack in the North
the momentum of the attack is to be broken by defense in
depth .... The increase in appropriations, in addition to
reductions in the peacetime establishment, will make
possible... considerable modernization of
equipment .... [Ref. 6. p. 23]
The great difficulty that must be redreessed in the Army
is that troop numbers did not fall in the 1960s and 1970s
with the dramatic drop in defense appropriations. This has
been partly due to significant political resistance to the
reduction of the regimental training garrisons in the
countryside from local residents who have an economic
dependency on the existing structure. The Agrarian Centre
Party has harnessed much of this political resistance from
what is often referred to as the "military communes
complex." [Ref. 12]
The Supreme Commander has indicated that the Army may be
left with insufficient land forces under the current defense
plan to defend all of Sweden, particularly in the North,
which would necessitate an order of priority in defending
specific key regions --- with obvious domestic and
international (Norway) political undertones. This will
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continue the thirty year trend of placing more of the
defense burden on the Swedish Air Force, which is also
decreasing in size while upgrading quality (from 29 suadrons
to a projected 17-18 by 2005). Richard Bitzinger's RAND
study, Facing the Future: The Swedish Air Force, 1990-2005,
concludes that:
The SwAF (Swedish Air Force) will not be able to
compensate fully for the decline in the other
services .... The risk is that Swedish defenses could become
a hollow shell, that is, a strong projected defense with
little behind it. In particular the armed forces could
find it impossible to defend all parts of the country,
while a perimeter defense strategy might have to be
abandoned.. .Moreover, despite the apparent end of the Cold
War and the subsequent increase in strategic warning,
tactical warning time is actually decreasing.... [Ref.
48:p. 511
In the course of this defense "mission" debate, the Supreme
Commander demanded his mission mandate be changed to require
his forces be capable of defending Sweden against an
aggressor only until "outside" forces could intervene.
There is an apparent correlation here to the domestic policy
debates of an "Atlantic Link" and "Nordic Block" within a
European security structure --- all of which imply US
assistance to Sweden in the event of an unlikely and
unanticipated major Russian military assault. [Ref. 66]
Off the record discussions with military officers also
indicated that the new security policy was being interpreted
as fielding force structure with a defensive military
capability allowing Sweden to remain non-aligned in peace
with the possibility of retaining the option of remaining
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neutral in the initial stages of a war in the Nordic region.
But this is not an official policy view.
D. NAVY
In the late 1950s Sweden began phasing out its fleet of
frigates and destroyers, feeling they were too vulnerable to
attack. It became the Air force's mission to defeat an
invasion fleet with strike aircraft [Ref. 7:p. 3291. In the
late 60s the Riksdag abolished Sweden's ASW capability. It
was felt ASW was only useful to protect their own shipping
in a World War II type of confrontation, which would be
meant by diplomatic means. Though only minor budget outlays
were allocated in the 1980s to redress readily apparent ASW
deficiencies, "In reality, a much larger share of the budget
is actually spent on ASW, and it is estimated 50 percent of
the navy's current activities (1989) are actually devoted
to ASW at the expense of other training missions." [Ref.
53:p. 1991
One explanation for Swedish difficulties in prosecuting
intruding Soviet submarines is that their naval forces have
been formed to counter a Soviet invasion not a peacetime
threat. The navy's missile and torpedo boats were designed
to remain survivable by hiding in the archipelago with their
RBS-15s (70km range), and defend the coast with the support
of 12 submarines and 30 coastal artillery battalions (which
are being modernized). Additionally six Air Force squadrons
of AJ 37 Viggen are dedicated for naval missions. Sweden's
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surface fleet currently consists of 28 missile boats of late
1970s vintage and 6 corvettes (the last four will be
operational in 1993) and seven modern minehunters. [Ref.
53:p. 202] [Ref. 104:p. 581
Captain Lars Wedin of the Joint Defense Staff, expressed
the great frustration Swedish Naval officers experienced
with the submarine intrusions. Some of the not widely
publicized difficulties include attempting to prosecute
submarines and submersibles in very shallow water (20m) with
depth charges jettisoned from 500 ton patrol craft,
necessarily limiting "loiter time." What is needed is a
small ASROC type weapon which can be launched from small
patrol boats (under development). Submarine intrusions will
likely remain a difficult problem though recent relaxation
in their ROE may ease the burden. Now hostile contacts can
be sunk without warning in territorial waters (previously
allowed in internal waters only). The Sweden have developed
considerable local expertise in such operations that would
be of great use in assisting any US Baltic ASW operations.
They are also adept at mine warfare. Additionally, they
produce naval weapons systems, including advanced mine
detectors, that are optimized for Baltic conditions (Recent
difficulties in operating Italian torpedoes were attributed
to its unsuitability for the local maritime environment).
But it is also worth noting that the entire Swedish Navy,
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including the coastal artillery, is roughly equivalent in
personnel to one US carrier battle group. [Ref. 21]
C. COMMID, CONTROL, COIMUNICATION AND INTELLIGENCE
Though the post-Cold War environment with the resultant
decline in the Russian military's infrastructure for waging
a major attack has increased strategic warning time,
technological advances have decreased tactical warning time.
This was stated by Prime Minister Bildt:
The primary basis for establishing the dimensions of our
defense forces should no longer be broadly-based attacks
on our country, with protracted preparations, and aiming
to conquer our territory in stages. Instead, the focus
should be on an attack with a heavy emphasis on the time
factor, with more limited resources but of the highest
quality, and with maximum utilization of military
surprise. [Ref. 56:p. 4]
Sweden has an advanced signals intelligence (SIGINT)
system run by the National Defense Radio Irstitute. They
operate a SIGINT maritime platform, the Orion, and have
cooperated in the past in strategic matters on a bilateral
basis with Western intelligence organizations [Ref. 48:p.
22]. Additionally, they are actively involved in the Baltic
states, along with the other Nordic countries, in
establishing economic, political and security institutions.
It can be conjectured that they have a very good human
intelligence (HUMINT) capability in these states.
The Swedish Air Force holds the mission of initial front
line response and operates the tactical early warning and
defense system. Their Command, control, communication and
intelligence (C31) system is known as Stril 60. This system
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includes underground and hardened as well as mobile systems.
Most radar stations are in the East part of the country.
Sector operations centers (SOCs) can directly coordinate
maritime and air intercepts through a data link [Ref. 48:pp.
223-23]. Writes Bitzinger, "...the Sw AF is one of the best
air forces in Europe, particularly in the area of air
defense." [Ref. 48:p. 27]
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VIII. COOPERATION WITH US FORCES
The CNA December 1992 study, Multinational Naval
Cooperation Options with the North Atlantic Countries,
identifies three dimensions of US naval cooperation bearing
on Sweden: bilateral, multilateral defense of Europe, and
multilateral outside of Europe. The questions that need to
be addressed from these dimensions are: (1) the
identification of parallel interests and the utility of
continued or expanded bilateral ties; (2) Sweden's
:reference for regional security organizations; (3) and a
determination of what structures exist or can be improved
for out of area crises response operations with Sweden [Ref.
27:p. 1]. This thesis has already identified where post-
Cold War Swedish and US security interests coincide, and the
most likely trend of this relationship. Swedish attitudes
to regional security organizations have also been detailed.
This section will focus on the potential for direct military
cooperation with Sweden.
A. INTELLIGENCE SHARING
Sweden has much to offer, in both strategic and tactical
intelligence, for any US forces operating in the Baltic
littoral region. However, it needs to be stressed that
intelligence cooperation with the US and NATO has been much
publicized in the Swedish press. Political polarization of
opinion on this issue could significantly affect the degree
and form of intelligence cooperation in a potential regional
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contingency. The most critical statements, imply that
Sweden has been a stooge for NATO, providing the West with
sophisticated intelligence on Soviet SAM systems (SA-10)
that would assist in a US Navy sea launched cruise missile
(SLCM) attack from the Norwegian Sea. The most damming
charge was that such intelligence collection was of no value
to Sweden, but undertaken by Sweden on the US's behalf as an
exchange for such things as sophisticated US collection
equipment and an implicit security guarantee. A well
respected researcher and writer on this issue, Wilhelm
Agrell, of the University of Lund, has expressed the view in
his writings, that the real issue is not whether this
intelligence cooperation with the West did or did not occur,
but that it developed into an institutional arrangement that
favored NATO security interests at the expense of Sweden's.
Writes Agrell about his perception of past Swedish
cooperation with the US and its damaging effect on Sweden's
intelligence services and overall security:
The significant thing is the distribution of work which
develops when a small country begins to specialize in
something which gives hard currency in return, while at
the same time it starts neglecting matters which are of
vital importance to its own security.
And Sweden could have been subjected to all the dangers of
alliance relations without enjoying the security
guarantee. From this angle Swedish membership in NATO
would have been a better solution than the double
burden of mon credible neutrality and a secret
collaborative alliance. (Ref. 105:pp. 37-38]
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B. REGIONAL CONTINGENCIES
The Baltic region is clearly undergoing a major
transition in its security relationships. Great economic
and political stability will likely continue for the rest of
the decade, particularly in Russia and the Baltic states.
One US planning scenario printed in the US press in February
1992 attributed to the Defense Planning Group (DPG)
described a NATO response to a Polish-Lithuanian-Russian
crisis in which US carrier battle groups (CVBGs) were a key
component to a NATO intervention. [Ref. 106:p. 47]
The geographic significance of Sweden and the military,
intelligence and logistic assets Sweden could contribute to
such a regional operation have already been detailed. In
conversations with FOA analysts and military officers it was
clear that a direct Swedish military contribution to such a
contingency would not be compatible with current security
policy. This policy is evolving but a conjecture of how
Sweden might react to the described specific scenario, ten,
even five years hence, is to great of an analytical leap to
contribute much of use. The major factors which are shaping
Sweden's evolving security policy; Russia's integration into
the West, Sweden's integration into the EC, and the future
of NATO --- remain unresolved. However, it is probably a
sound axiom that direct Swedish military involvement, under
any scenario, which would involve engagement with Russian
forces in which Sweden is not first attacked by Russian
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forces, is out of the question. When asked in an interview
what Sweden's response would be if the Russians intervened
militarily in the Baltics, Schori answered, *Strong
diplomatic protest." [Ref. 13]
The possibility of a resurgent Sweden as a regional
power in the Baltic, showing the flag, voiced by some
military officers, has met with significant political
opposition. It would be hard to imagine Sweden under any
scenario having the military capability to compete with even
a further incapacitated Russia, or even Germany. This does
not mean Sweden's foreign policy would not support a forward
US foreign policy in the region during a Baltic crisis.
Sweden can be expected to remain in the forefront of
providing diplomatic, institutional and economic support for
the Baltic states, and can be counted on to provide
significant "non-lethal" aid. They will not intervene
militarily, except perhaps in limited tactical instances to
deter criminality in the Baltic during a potential "refugee"
crisis. The granting of overflights rights to US military
aircraft would D-obably be granted during a Balkan crisis
for missions of a purely humanitarian nature.
1. Peacetime Regioual Cooperation with the US
For the first time Sweden participated in a US lead
Baltic naval exercise in June 1993, BALTOPS 93.
Traditionally, the NATO Baltic states, the Danes and
Germans, have partic4-ated w.i.th US units. The Swedes made a
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point of officially emphasizing that this was a non-NATO
exercise. other first time participants this year include
all three Baltic states (EstoiAia and Latvia only observer
status) and, very importantly, the Russians. Russian
participation was tenuous, and there was last minute concern
that their withdrawal might induce a Swedish one.
Fortunately, this did not occur. This highlights a
continued Swedish sensitivity to closer military cooperation
with NATO countries and acute attention to the extra-
regional East-West strategic relationship. This sensitivity
will remain a domestic political constraint on the range of
policies the Defense Ministry can implement, not necessarily
dependent on an optimum strategy determination. The "non-
traditional" participants (non-NATO) in BALTOPS-93
contributed to the first phase of the exercise which
included basic seamanship, search and rescue (SAR) and
communication drills, but abstained from the second phase
which encompassed the traditional ASW, anti-air warfare
(AAW) and mine counter measures (MCM) exercises. [Ref. 51
[Ref. 27:p. 61
When directly asked if it was the Social Democrat
(opposition) position that it would always be necessary for
the Russians to be participants in any joint USMATO -
Swedish exercise, Schori responded in the affirmative.
However he expressed no reservations what so ever about
cooperating with the US in internationally sanctioned
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intervention outside the Nordic region without the Russians.
Referring to Bosnia specifically, he stated that the NSwedes
would work with anyone.N When asked about NATO he responded
in the affirmative. Again, a key distinction is that these
operations are outside of Sweden's strategic proximity.
[Ref. 13]
2. Out of Area Cooperation
Prime Minister Bildt expressed the worth and utility
of joint international involvement to further respect for
international law and the value of the US contribution
during the Gulf War. However, also expressed were the view
that US capabilities to shoulder the dominant role in such a
coalition will decrease: "In the long term.. .with the high
probability of a decline in US military strength, the
special potential of the United States for intervention in
conflicts all over the world will probably diminish." [Ref.
56:p. 9] Any cooperation with the US in an out of area
crisis will be within an international structure under
current government policy. Clearly this policy would not be
changed by a Social Democratic government. The UN and CSCE
are presently the two viable organizations for such
cooperation. Gary Geipel's CNA study contends that, "It is
likely that both Finland and Sweden would respond more
favorably to proposals for naval cooperation - particularly
in a crisis situation - that came from other European
(particularly EC) countries rather than from the United
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States." [Ref. 27:p. 45] Due to Sweden's domestic political
environment, Geipel is probably correct, it would certainly
be politically less volatile.
a. ON Peacekeeping
Prime Minister Bildt includes the need for a UN
peace-keeping capability in Sweden's defense planning,"
... total defense should have the ability to participate in
United Nations peace-keeping operations." [Ref. 56:p. 49]
The Social Democrats have placed even greater emphasis on
this mission as a component of security policy. Sweden has
traditionally had a high participation in UN peace-keeping
operations, expending 3% of its defense budget in the early
1980s on such UN efforts. Currently however, expenses for
the Swedish battalion in the Nordic brigade now in Bosnia,
are budgeted through the Foreign Ministry, not the Defense
Ministry which has been able to resist such expenditure.
The Swedish hospital unit in Somalia was similarly budgeted
[Ref. 5]. Currently Sweden forces are also active in
Peacekeeping and similar UN missions in Angola, Croatia,
Cyprus, El Salvador, India / Pakistan, Iraq / Kuwait, Korea,
Lebanon and Middle East (UNTSO) [Ref. 80:p. 85].
Three hundred US combat troops have deployed
(July 1993) to Macedonia, joining a 700 man Scandinavian
battalion, which includes a Swedish company. [Ref. 107:p. A-
1]. The two most obvious operational questions of such a
joint US-Swedish deployment where real tactical danger may
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develop, are: (1) how does such a force integrate
intelligence; and (2) incorporate external fire support,
particularly close air support.
Both the Danes and the Norwegians are US NATO
allies and have an operational structure to address these
issues. The Swedes are not allies and have no such
structure or operational experience in working with US
forces. It can be speculated that US intelligence is passed
to the Swedes through the Danes and Norwegians in an ad hoc
matter. A formal approach to such ad hoc intelligence
sharing with Sweden, or within coalitions in general, would
be of future use. Within the context of joint naval
operations, Rear Admiral Edward D. Sheafer, Jr., Director
of Naval Intelligence, has highlighted the significance of
this issue and the constructive role exercises and military
exchanges can play in overcoming this difficulty: "The
coalition forces drawn into a regional conflict will come
from all parts of the world, and maritime intelligence must
support them as an integrated force." [Ref. 108:p. 161
In discussions at FOA and the Joint Defense
Staff there is an adamant weakness in Swedish training to
utilize close-air-support (CAS) in such operations. The
Swedish Airforce has not stressed the CAS role. There was
some sentiment expressed in off the record interviews that
the "lack of a ground attack" training was due to an early
political decision intended to alleviate Soviet concerns of
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a any tactical offensive threat from the Swedish Air Force.
This was also attributed to be one reason the Gripen was
designed with a comparatively limited range. Furthermore,
until recently Swedish "peace-keeping" units were filled by
volunteers who had already completed their mandatory
conscript service. Competition has traditionally been very
fierce and the men are handpicked by their battalion
commander, useful blue collar skills are a premium
(construction workers, electricians, etc.). A short two
week refresher training is provided (all volunteers have
already undergone their basic military training service).
However, such units are deemed insufficient for the "peace-
enforcement" role. The Danes have stood up an "elite" unit
with real "combat" capability for UN/CSCE peace-enforcing
missions. In 1993 Sweden also began establishing a much
more substantial training program for such UN/CSCE missions.
The Social Democrats have championed this mission, against
the opposition of the government. [Ref. 16] [Ref. 21]
The Swedish Navy has further specific
constraints on participation in out of area international
peace-keeping or peace-enforcing missions. Its fleet has
virtually no experience nor has it been designed for
extensive deployments outside of the Baltic. They do not
practice underway replenishment, for example.
Additionally, Swedish officers no longer hold the Kings
Commission and can not be ordered to service abroad nor can
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conscripts (The Swedish Navy has no career petty officers,
few conscripts). [Ref. 21)
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IX. CONCLUSIONS
The two overriding and inter-related developments that
are shaping changes in Swedish security policy are the end
of the Cold War and Sweden's integration into the EC. As
the bipolar strategic regime fades Swedish security policy
is integrating with larger European security questions, and
therefore is likely to lose some of its distinctiveness.
However, Sweden will retain distinctive characteristics in
her approach to security questions.
Large segments of the Swedish population associate the
traditional "neutrality" policy with their cultural
identity. All the major parties feel the need to at least
pay "lip service" to this traditional policy until Sweden is
safely integrated into the EC. The elites in the Moderate
lead Government as well as the Social Democratic opposition
agree on the need for EC membership, but both fear a "no"
vote on the EC referendum. It is in the interest of the
major parties not to raise the security implications of EC
membership into a political debate before the EC referendum.
The move away from neutrality while still prohibiting
formal military alliances, allows for a looser
interpretation of ad hoc military cooperation in the sense
that foreign policy no longer has to heed the declaratory
non-alignment criteria. What can dramatically change this
trend towards greater cooperation with the West is the rise
of a resurgent reactionary regime in Moscow. The key to
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predicting how this would affect Sweden's security policy,
and the move away from "neutrality," is when this occurred.
The seizure of power by a reactionary government in Russia
will probably accelerate Sweden's integration into Europe if
it occurred several years hence after the process of
integration has beon institutionalized. If such a threat
arose before the EC referendum, there would be very strong
domestic political pressure to withdraw back into an
isolationist policy.
When reading Swedish literature it is important to note
that the term usecurity policym is often used --- not to
refer to traditional defense policy --- but to such things
as refugees, crime and environmental degradation. If the
Social Democrats return to power, the rhetoric of this
difference in nuance in "security policy" will differ
further than the current government, with the weight on the
non-military, non-traditional aspects of security. But the
danger or likelihood that a new Social Democratic lead
government will significantly reverse course on the move
away from neutrality is low. The drive for formal change in
Sweden's d.claratory security policy is the need to
facilitate Sweden's acceptance and subsequent integration
into the ZC. This will not change if the Social Democrats
regain power.
Recent Swedish emphasis on arms control and CSBMs, has a
much different meaning than traditional "utopian" Swedish
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arms control positions. CSBMs are seen by many in the
defense community as a way to cooperate with the West
through exchanges without creating an unwanted and possibly
destructive domestic political backlash. Much of the
significance to the Swedes of arms control measures, such as
CBSMs, administered by international organizations such as
the CSCE, the UN and Council of Europe, is that they provide
a mechanism for the Swedish defence community to participate
and demonstrate a useful contribution to European security
while still remaining outside of a formal alliance. There
is a timely need to demonstrate such a contribution while
Sweden's EC integration is pending.
Concern for the environmental effects from the crumbling
nuclear infrastructure of the former Soviet Union is viewed
as a "security" threat. There is deep concern over the rise
in "criminality" in the Baltic states and Russia, and the
potential there for criminal "warlords" to obtain nuclear
weapons amidst the chaos. Amongst most defense thinkers,
the NWFZ is a dead issue.
Though the global military capabilities of Russia have
declined precipitously, Russia is, and is likely to continue
to be the preponderant military force in the region. There
is a view in Sweden and Norway, known as the "sausage
theory", which holds that the strategic significance of the
Nordic region actually is increasing for the Russians as
there military complexes on the Kola Peninsula, particularly
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their SSBNs, shoulders relatively more of Russian strategic
capabilities. A corollary of this theory is that as the
Russian capability to project military power declines
overall, they may be more likely to project it on the
Northern Flank where they retain a favorable correlation of
forces. Though this theory is belittled by many on the
left, such as Pierre Schori, long term concern with Russian
military capabilities will remain a permanent fixture of
Swedish security policy. In all scenarios the strategic and
environmental nuclear threats on the Kola Peninsula will
remain.
Fostering economic and political stability in the former
Soviet Union, particularly in the Baltic states, is a
"security" objective. Defense Minister Bjorck, however, has
made a note of emphasizing, that Sweden can not assume the
responsibility for the military security of the Baltic
states and does not wish to engender false hope. Radar,
communication and other "non-lethal" equipment is being
provided, but not heavy armaments. The Baltic security
threat is perceived in terms of the already developing
massive influx of refugees, viewed as a crisis, particularly
in lieu of a Sweden's very high unemployment rate.
With the gradual drawback in US naval exercises and
operations in the North Atlantic and Norwegian Sea there is
Swedish concern that a power vacuum may develop in the
North. A traditional tenet of Swedish strategic thinking
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has been the need for a balance along the Northern or
"Atlantic" axis. It will remain in Sweden's national
interest for the US to retain a viable strategic presence in
the North Atlantic. An aspect of this perception can be
seen in the "Nordic Bloc" component of a "common European
security system" proposed by the Supreme Commander Bengt
Gustafsson. The current objective of a "Nordic bloc" is to
retain the Atlantic (US) link within a united Europe. A
"European Pillar" to NATO is not viewed by many,
particularly in the military, as sufficient to counter the
long term potential threat remaining on the Kola Peninsula.
The WEU is not viewed as a viable alternative to NATO. The
CSCE is probably the most likely forum, outside of UN
humanitarian and peacekeeping operations, for Sweden to
become actively engaged in military cooperation with the
West. Questions on future collective security arrangements
will remain secondary agenda items until the population
approves the referendum on EC membership.
The current impetus for increase in the defense budget
has been the long delayed need to modernize, particularly
the Army --- not strategic change. The second "driver" for
reversing decades of relative defense reductions is the
technological revolution in warfighting and the new
equipment it requires. Swedish policy makers have clearly
reiterated that domestic production of arms remains a pillar
of their strategy. Paradoxically, as American and Swedish
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relations have improved, the likelihood of Sweden's reliance
on American systems, in the long term, appears to have
diminished and closer cooperation with European industry
more likely. In the short term, the end of the Cold War
will allow Sweden to cooperate more closely with joint
international defense projects. It is no longer a Swedish
diplomatic goal to maintain the appearance of a neutral
foreign policy. Therefore defense industry planning has
more freedom to maximize economic interests.
The major current project for Swedish defense industries
as a whole is the JAS 39 Gripen. The Gripen has been
plagued by cost overruns, but the first Gripen was delivered
to the Swedish Air Force in June 1993. In addition to its
core aerospace industry, Sweden is also a technological
leader in diesel submarine technology and shallow water ASW,
mine warfare and adept in building small tonnage surface
combatants.
Sweden's 1992-97 Defense Bill is a significant attempt
to modernize their forces and a change in assigned tasks.
Planning will now focus on tactical surprise. A changed
threat now requires mechanized land forces capable of
mobilizing much more quickly. Discussions with military
officers also indicated that the new security policy was
being unofficially interpreted by some as a force structure
with a defensive military capability only sufficient for
allowing Sweden to remain non-aligned in peace with the
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possibility of retaining the option of remaining neutral in
the initial stages of a war.
Sweden has much to offer, in both strategic and tactical
intelligence, for any US forces operating in the Baltic
littoral region. However, political polarization of opinion
on this issue could significantly affect the degree and form
of intelligence cooperation in a potential regional
contingency. Direct Swedish military contribution to such a
Baltic contingency would not be compatible with current
security policy. It is probably a sound axiom that direct
Swedish military involvement, under any scenario, which
would involve engagement with Russian forces in which Sweden
is not first attacked by Russian forces, is out of the
question.
For the first time Sweden participated in a US lead
Baltic naval exercise in June 1993, BALTOPS 93. But there
is a continued Swedish sensitivity to closer military
cooperation with NATO countries, particularly in the Nordic
region. Any cooperation with the US in an out of area
crisis will be within an international structure under
current government policy. This policy would not likely be
changed by a $Social Democratic government. The UN and CSCE
are presently the two viable organizations for such
cooperation. The Swedish Navy has further specific
constraints on participation in out of area international
peace-keeping or peace-enforcing missions in that its fleet
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has virtually no experience nor has it been designed for
extensive deployments outside of the Baltic.
Sweden is not being driven into 'Europe' by the changed
strategic environment and the regional stability following
the Soviet collapse. Rather, it is more accurate to
characterize Sweden's policy shift as one primarily
motivated by economic necessity, enabled by the Soviet
collapse. Sweden is no longer "neutral" but will retain
many of the distinctive characteristics associated with its
traditional policy and Nordic identity. Membership in NATO
is not a near term reality. Membership in the WEU offers
few benefits. Joint operations with NATO forces,
particularly in conjunction with regional exercises and UN
or CSCE missions, will be more frequent. Limited Nordic
defense cooperation is progressing but will not proceed to a
degree which could interfere with Sweden's EC membership.
In the long term Sweden's membership in the EC will
facilitate greater integration with the European defense
industry and security structures. This European integration
portends greater cooperation within Europe than bilateral
links across the Atlantic. Such a development will impact
overall Swedish-US relations, which will become, part of the
larger US-European question. In this "European" context,
for strategic reasons, Sweden is likely to be amongst the
group within the EC most favorable to continued US
engagement on the continent. This pro-US attitude will best
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serve Sweden's long term interests and will likely remain
constant with changes in government.
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